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Abstract
This thesis studies the behavior of mutual fund managers. I explore the determinants
of mutual fund performance heterogeneity, the drivers of their investment decisions
with consequences for asset returns, and how they communicate with their investors.
Chapter 2 studies the relationship between U.S. mutual funds’ common holdings
and fund performance. In a network where funds are connected through portfolio
overlap, degree centrality of each fund represents the level of similarity with peers.
The results show that holdings similarity leads to lower abnormal fund returns.
Further tests suggest that information asymmetry is a potential explanation for this
relationship. The negative association between holdings similarity and fund perfor-
mance widens in volatile markets. In uncertain times, mutual funds move towards
their benchmark due to asset management constraints. This creates negative price
pressure on commonly held assets. A portfolio based on stocks owned by low vs.
high degree centrality funds yields abnormal returns of 7% per year. This chapter
provides new evidence of the informational advantage hypothesis as a driver of fund
performance. It also highlights negative externalities of asset management contracts.
In chapter 3, jointly with Dr. Constantinos Antoniou, we examine whether mutual
fund managers invest more heavily in firms in which they have previously experi-
enced higher returns. Using data from actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds,
we find results that support this hypothesis. Experienced returns affect how man-
agers rebalance their portfolios in response to flows, and influence investments at
the style level. Experienced returns do not affect the investments of index-tracking
funds. Experienced returns, when aggregated at the fund level across stocks, pre-
dict more aggressive trading behavior and lower fund returns, and when aggregated
across managers at the stock level, predict lower stock returns.
Finally, chapter 4 measures the extent of economic policy uncertainty language in
mutual fund communication and its effects on flows. I test the hypothesis that
mutual funds communicating more about uncertainty do so to obfuscate financially
relevant information. I find that the U.S. active mutual funds that use more words
related to economic policy uncertainty tend to be risky and poorly performing funds.
The use of uncertain economic terms has a positive effect on fund flows. The effect
ix
is stronger for retail funds and in expansion periods. Initial fees become less salient
when funds communicate more about economic uncertainty. The evidence presented
in this chapter suggest that mutual fund communication matters for fund flows.
x
Chapter 1
Introduction
The research area of investment has been an active field for many years. The U.S.
mutual fund industry has attracted the attention of researchers since the 1960s.
Indeed, over the last decades this industry has grown rapidly representing almost
$18 trillion at the end of 2018 according to the Investment Company Institute. As of
1994, mutual funds managed approximately $2 trillion (Gruber 1996). As a result,
many researchers devoted their attention to the understanding of this growth rate
and its rationale. More specifically, many studies explored the ability of mutual
fund managers to deliver positive returns to their investors, in order to explain the
growth of this industry.
Starting with Jensen (1968), the literature found little evidence of fund managers de-
livering positive performance over a benchmark (Malkiel 1995; Gruber 1996; Carhart
1997). On the other hand, a parallel list of studies found some evidence suggesting
that fund managers have an ability to deliver abnormal positive returns to their
investors (Grinblatt and Titman 1989, 1993; Grinblatt et al. 1995; Daniel et al.
1997).
Chapter 2 of this thesis aims at better understanding the heterogeneity of mutual
fund performance. In their seminal paper, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) explain that
if agents can collect information at a cost, they should earn superior returns. Along
these lines, several authors find indeed that informational advantage is a plausible
explanation for heterogeneous performance. For example, Kacperczyk et al. (2005)
find that mutual fund managers will concentrate their holdings on specific industries
where they have an informational advantage. Cohen et al. (2008) find that mutual
fund managers extract information from their social network and have concentrated
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holdings on stocks where they have educational connections with board members. As
a consequence, they earn superior returns on their connected companies. In a similar
spirit to Kacperczyk et al. (2005), Cici et al. (2018) show that fund managers will
place larger bets on industries where they have gained human capital from previous
work experience. This strand of literature shows that concentrated holdings and
informational advantage are valid explanations for heterogeneous performance in
the mutual fund industry.
Motivated by these findings, I measure, in chapter 2, concentrated holdings of fund
managers, not with respect to an industry as in Kacperczyk et al. (2005) or a
benchmark as in Cremers and Petajisto (2009), but by comparing fund managers
to each other. I build a network of mutual fund portfolio overlap. I connect fund
managers through the number of securities they have in common in their respective
portfolios. When computing the degree centrality of this network (i.e., the extent of
connectedness of the individual funds), I obtain a measure of holdings similarity at
the fund level. Typically, a mutual fund with a high degree centrality will be highly
connected to other mutual funds, i.e., it will own stocks that many of its peers
also own. The first finding is that degree centrality is negatively related to fund
performance. At the firm level, stocks owned by funds with low degree centrality
earn around 7% of additional abnormal returns compared to stocks owned by mutual
funds with high degree centrality. The results are robust to alternative measures of
centrality and alternative sets of neighbors in the network (e.g., style peers). I also
find that this effect is exacerbated in periods of market uncertainty, measured by
stock market volatility, due to asset management contracts as motivated by Buffa
et al. (2014).
I test the hypothesis that degree centrality relates to informational advantage. A
fund manager that owns stocks disregarded by its peers, possibly does so because
he has privileged information about these stocks. Using a change in regulation that
forced fund managers to disclose their holdings more frequently, I find evidence that
confirm this hypothesis.
A number of factors can explain fund managers heterogeneous investment decisions
such as informational advantage as explained in chapter 2, but also prior work
experience as in Cici et al. (2018). As fund managers over-invest in industries
where they have acquired on-the-job experience, it links to a growing and important
literature in behavioral economics on the effects of personal experience on economic
decisions. Malmendier and Nagel (2011) show that households that experienced
better stock market returns are more likely to participate in the stock market.
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Kaustia and Knu¨pfer (2008) find that individual investors in Finland are more likely
to subscribe to future initial public offering (IPO) if they have experienced good IPO
outcomes in the past. Motivated by these evidence of reinforcement learning, Dr.
Constantinos Antoniou and I study in chapter 3 the effect of experienced outcomes
on future investment decisions for mutual fund managers.
In chapter 3, we test the hypothesis that mutual fund managers will favor stocks
where they experienced good returns in the past. We measure stock-level experi-
ence for each fund manager as an exponentially weighted moving average of past
stock returns for the periods when a fund manager was holding the stock. Using an
exponentially weighted moving average allows us to account for the recency effect,
often observed in studies on memory (e.g., Baddeley and Hitch 1993). Our results
show that fund managers that experienced better returns on a given firm will place a
larger bet of 0.01%. Unobserved time-varying firm of fund characteristics cannot ex-
plain this relationship. Aggregated across all stocks, fund managers allocate around
$30M of capital in a quarter across firms on the basis of experience effects when
considering the average fund size. We also document that these experience-driven
investment decisions have important consequences for asset returns. Moreover, rein-
forcement learning does not lead to better performance for fund managers. As they
experience better returns, they tend to become overconfident and more aggressive
in their trading behavior, at the expense of future performance (Gervais and Odean
2001).
A possibility for the lack of ability of mutual fund managers to deliver positive
returns is the cost of active investing. Fama and French (2010) found that fund
managers can generate performance, however the latter becomes negative when
considering expenses. Moreover, a potential explanation for investors delegating
their capital to fund managers despite their poor returns is a failure to account for
this cost of active investing. For example, Barber et al. (2005) found the investors
are less sensitive to operating expenses compared to fees paid upfront.
The mixed evidence regarding performance found in the literature combined with
the growth of the industry attracted the interest of regulators too. As almost half
of U.S. households invest in mutual funds in 2016, according to the Investment
Company Institute, regulators aim to protect households from a misunderstanding
of fund fees for example. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) wrote that
the information provided by mutual funds to their investors in their prospectuses
are often long and complex (Beshears et al. 2009).1 This motivated the SEC to
1SEC Release No. 33-8861.
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propose in late 2007 and adopt a summary prospectus, a form designed to simplify
communication about mutual fund characteristics for investors. This opened the
avenue of research related to mutual fund communication explored in the last chapter
of this thesis.
In chapter 4, I explore the role of mutual fund communication in explaining the
growth rate of the mutual fund industry. Mutual funds communicate with their
investors through various channels including shareholders’ reports (N-CSR SEC
form). In these forms, mutual funds disclose their performance, risk, expenses,
and also their vision of the economy. While the first parts are mandatory and reg-
ulated, there are no restrictions to what extent funds can express their views on
the economy. I hypothesize that an emphasis on economic uncertainty in mutual
fund communication will help mutual funds limiting outflows of capital. Indeed, if
a mutual fund with poor performance express an uncertain economic environment,
this can serve as a justification for the low returns delivered by the fund, and thus,
investors will possibly punish less fund managers by taking money out of the fund.
I measure economic uncertainty in shareholders’ reports following Baker et al. (2016)
by counting the number of occurrences of words related to economic policy uncer-
tainty. I find that poorly performing and risky funds are more likely to emphasize
on economic uncertainty. Moreover, I find that increasing the number of words re-
lated to economic policy uncertainty leads to higher capital flows by approximately
4% per year, controlling for other fund characteristics such as performance, past
flows, and expenses. The effect is stronger for mutual funds in the bottom of the
performance distribution. Additionally, I find that upfront costs are less salient if
mutual funds communicate more about economic uncertainty (Barber et al. 2005).
This suggests that strategic communication can help obfuscate financially relevant
information such as fund expenses.
To summarize, this thesis explores the determinants of mutual fund performance,
investment decisions, and communication. As the size of this industry represented
approximately $18 trillion according to the Investment Company Institute, it is im-
portant to understand their interactions with investors, as a significant part of them
are households. The key findings show that informational advantage is an expla-
nation for the observed differences in fund performance. Moreover, fund managers
are influenced by their personal experience when they make investment decisions,
which has consequences for asset prices. Finally, even in the presence of disclosure
rules, fund managers have room for strategic communication. Using economic un-
certainty in fund documents, which has been little studied so far, helps explaining
4
the puzzling growth rate of this industry.
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Chapter 2
Common Holdings and Mutual
Fund Performance
2.1 Introduction
The asset management industry has grown at a remarkable pace in the last decades.
In 2018, U.S. active equity mutual funds’ total net assets represented around $18
trillion, and about 70 times less in 1980. Institutional investors have become more
important for both regulatory bodies and households.1 In the U.S., around 5% of
the latter held mutual funds in 1980 and approximately 45% in 2018.2 Yet, questions
remain open about funds’ ability to deliver performance and its drivers.
In a frictionless efficient market, institutional investors’ performance would be ho-
mogeneous. The observed heterogeneity in trades and performance can be driven
by informational advantage (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz 1980; Hellwig 1980; Kyle
1985). Building on these theories, several studies show that concentration is optimal
for well-informed investors. Kacperczyk et al. (2005) show that industry concentra-
tion leads to better performance. Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) explain
how informational advantage can explain the home bias. Previous studies have fo-
cused on inferring investors’ informational advantage relative to a benchmark such
as industries (Kacperczyk et al. 2005) or the market (Cremers and Petajisto 2009).
In this study, I explore how comparing mutual funds’ holdings to each other helps
deducing informational advantage and superior performance.
1See “Asset Management and Financial Stability”, Office of Financial Research, Department of
the Treasury, 2013.
2Investment Company Institute.
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In this chapter, I test the hypothesis that differences in mutual fund holdings is
related to informational advantage. Using quarterly mutual fund holdings data from
1980:Q1 to 2016:Q4, I implement network analysis and connect actively managed
U.S. equity mutual funds through their portfolio overlap (i.e., the number of stocks
in common). The degree centrality of each mutual fund in the network at each
quarter is measuring its holdings similarity with its peers.3
I find that mutual fund degree centrality has a negative and statistically significant
effect on mutual fund performance. A one standard deviation increase in degree
centrality leads to lower abnormal fund performance in the next quarter of roughly
0.2% (t-stat= -7.46) when performance is measured using the four-factor model
(Carhart 1997). This main result cannot be explained by other fund characteristics
(e.g., size, flows, or other measures of activeness relative to a benchmark such as
active share or tracking error). Thus, mutual funds with low holdings similarity
with peers perform better.
To investigate if degree centrality relates to informational advantage, I use a change
in regulation as a quasi-natural experiment. In May 2004, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) required more frequent portfolio disclosure from mutual
funds.4 Agarwal et al. (2015) find that more informed funds, proxied by high past
abnormal performance, had their performance worsened following this regulation. If
degree centrality relates to informational advantage, this result should hold for mu-
tual funds with low degree centrality. I test this hypothesis following Agarwal et al.
(2015). Results show that mutual funds with low degree centrality had their perfor-
mance decreased by -6.7% (t-stat= -2.21) in the year 2004. This finding is consistent
with a coordination in information acquisition and asset purchases (Veldkamp 2006).
Fund managers’ initial informational advantage disappears as other fund managers
can learn about the same assets owned by the best performing managers, once their
holdings are disclosed more frequently.
Previous literature shows that fund managers tend to group stocks into categories
and focus on particular styles (Barberis and Shleifer 2003). To assess a mutual fund
manager’s holdings similarity with peers, it is thus also suitable to compare him with
his style peers as opposed to the whole universe of managers. Using Morningstar
3For example, in a network composed of three funds (A, B, and C) where the first two have four
stocks in common while the third fund does not share any position with the others, fund C’s degree
centrality will be 0 and 4 for A and B since this is their overlap (i.e., the weight associated to their
connection).
4The portfolio disclosure frequency moved from semiannually to quarterly.
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style classification, I group mutual funds into nine style groups.5 At each quarter,
there are nine networks composed of funds within each style category. I compute
network degree centrality for each mutual fund within style clusters. I find a negative
relationship of degree centrality on fund performance with the same magnitude as
in the main results.
Investors give incentives to their mutual fund managers to be active. To do so, they
base compensation contracts on relative performance to a benchmark. Tracking
error constraints are often part of the terms. Thus, mutual fund managers cannot be
as active as they want, especially in volatile markets. These institutional incentives
can exacerbate price distortions (Buffa et al. 2014; Lines 2016).
Motivated by this mechanism, I study how holdings similarity changes in periods
of uncertainty. I find that degree centrality increases in a volatile phase, defined
by quarters when the Volatility Index (V IX) is in the top decile. This suggests
that managers respond to their contract clause by moving closer to their peers when
prices are volatile. Moreover, the negative relationship between degree centrality and
fund performance is amplified in these phases. When facing volatility, mutual fund
managers create negative price pressure on common assets. This creates spillovers
on connected mutual funds. Thus, mutual funds with high degree centrality exhibit
lower cumulative abnormal returns.6
Finally, I extend the analysis at the stock level. If mutual funds with low degree
centrality earn higher abnormal fund returns due to informational advantage, their
holdings should exhibit higher stock returns. Building a long-short portfolio based
on stocks owned by mutual funds with low degree centrality on the long leg delivers
abnormal return of 7% per year.
This study’s contribution is threefold. First, this chapter relates to the large liter-
ature on mutual fund performance. Dating back to the late 60’s, researchers have
long examined and argued about the existence, determinants, and persistence of
mutual fund performance (e.g., Jensen 1968; Gruber 1996; Carhart 1997). Co-
hen et al. (2005) show that managers who make decisions similar to distinguished
peers do better. Cremers and Petajisto (2009) show that deviations from bench-
mark positively predict fund performance. Amihud and Goyenko (2013) find that
mutual funds’ R-squared obtained from multi-factor models negatively predict per-
5A 3×3 style box composed of small/mid/large-value/blend/growth funds.
6Chernenko and Sunderam (2017) show evidence of fire sales externalities for mutual funds.
Moreover, mutual funds cannot internalize these externalities as they don’t know precisely how
many of their numerous peers follow the same strategies and buy the same stocks (Stein 2009).
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formance.7 Amihud and Goyenko (2013) explain that mutual funds with lower R-
squared track factors less closely and thus relates to higher selectivity. This chapter
differs from their study as lower degree centrality means that mutual funds follow
less closely their peers, as opposed to factors. More recently, Hoberg et al. (2017)
show that mutual funds outperforming their style peers tend to have larger abnormal
performance going forward. The results presented in this chapter are consistent with
the buy-side competition aspect of Hoberg et al. (2017). It suggests that mutual
funds facing lower style competition can do better. This chapter differs as it builds
on a different market friction as a source of fund performance difference, namely
information asymmetry rather than the imperfect competition as emphasized in
Hoberg et al. (2017). In a related work, Sun et al. (2012) show that hedge funds
with more distinct historical returns relative to their peers have better subsequent
performance. A hedge fund with a unique strategy will have a higher measure of
distinctiveness. This study contributes to this literature by providing a new measure
of holdings similarity to relates to informational advantage and is robust to existing
measures of concentration (e.g., Cremers and Petajisto 2009).
Second, this chapter contributes to the growing literature on the adverse effects of
benchmarking. Due to agency frictions, contracts link compensation to performance
relative to a benchmark (Buffa et al. 2014). With volatile prices, fund managers
are exposed to greater risks when being mismatched to the benchmark. Thus, they
move towards the index in uncertain times and exacerbate price distortions. These
externalities on asset prices have been documented by Lines (2016).8 I provide new
evidence on the negative effects of benchmarking on fund performance. It stems
from negative price pressure exercised by mutual funds in uncertain times.
Finally, this study contributes to the extensive financial networks literature. An-
ton and Polk (2014) look at the asset pricing implications of securities’ ownership
structure. They show that shared ownership between stocks predicts cross-sectional
variations in return correlation. Bartram et al. (2015) show that international stock
returns can be affected by stocks connected by foreign ownership linkages. Ahern
(2013) shows that central industries, in an inter-sectoral trade network, earn higher
returns. At the fund level, Wahal and Wang (2011) look at the fees and flow compe-
7Other studies on performance drivers include for instance Kacperczyk et al. (2005), Titman
and Tiu (2011), Jiang et al. (2014), and Doshi et al. (2015). More generally, deviation from peers
can be due to skills, informational advantage, but also investment mandates, herding (Jiang and
Verardo 2018) or unobserved actions of managers (Kacperczyk et al. 2006).
8Other studies on the link between asset management contracts and market outcomes include
for instance Cuoco and Kaniel (2011), Basak and Pavlova (2013), Garleanu and Pedersen (2017),
Ibert et al. (2017), and Ma et al. (2019).
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tition among funds to attract investors in the case of new entrants. Recent studies
found that a fund’s importance in a information-based network is associated with
higher performance (e.g., Ozsoylev et al. 2014, and Rossi et al. 2018).9 In this study,
I propose a network of mutual funds connected through portfolio overlap and show
that degree centrality is disadvantageous in this context.
2.2 Data
I collect quarterly mutual fund holdings data from Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund
Holdings database from 1980:Q1 to 2016:Q4. I obtain mutual fund characteristics
(total net assets, monthly net returns, expense ratios, turnover ratios, and fund age)
from the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free U.S. Mutual Fund database. I aggregate vari-
ables for multiple share classes and aggregate monthly returns to obtain quarterly
returns. I use MFLinks to merge the two databases.
Since the focus is on domestic actively managed equity mutual funds, I restrict
the investment objective code reported by Thomson Reuters to be either aggressive
growth, growth, growth and income, balanced, or unclassified following Lou (2012).
Furthermore, I require total net assets (TNA) reported by CRSP to be minimum $1
million, and restrict the CRSP investment objective code to start with “ED” (equity
domestic).10 Finally, I exclude index funds using the CRSP index flag. Table 2.1
on page 11 reports key summary statistics of the final database for the different
summary statistics. The final dataset has 3,195 distinct mutual funds. We can also
see from Figure 2.1 on page 12 an increase in the number of funds but also in asset
under management over the years.
9Other related studies include for instance Hochberg et al. (2007) and Hochberg et al. (2010)
who study venture capital firms (VCs) network and find that central VCs firms have significantly
higher performance.
10The CRSP style objective code maps the existing investment objective codes (Wiesenberger,
Strategic Insight, and Lipper Objective Codes) in order to have a continuous code. It is a four-
characters code that correspond to four level of granularity. For example, the code “EDYG” denotes
an equity (E) domestic (D) with style (Y) defined as growth (G). I specify the code for each fund to
begin with ED in order to have domestic equity funds only and exclude short, hedged, and option
income funds using this mapping.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
This table shows summary statistics of fund characteristics. The sample consists of U.S. active
equity mutual funds from 1980:Q1 to 2016:Q4. Degree is the weighted degree centrality of the
common holdings network. Ret is the quarterly fund net return. Stocks is the number of stocks in
the portfolio. Fund age is the number of months since the fund’s inception. Flow is the net growth
of total net assets, winsorized at 1%. TNA (in millions of dollars) is total net assets. Distance is
the Euclidean distance between each fund and its peers. The distance matrix is computed from the
matrix of dollar positions invested by each fund in each asset divided by TNA. From the distance
matrix, I compute fund-level distances as the average of distances with all peers. Eigenvector is
the eigenvector centrality of the common holdings network.
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Degree 106,232 7,087.88 7,795.87 0 108,334
Ret 103,041 0.022 0.103 −0.616 0.924
ln(stocks) 103,041 4.245 0.750 0.000 7.754
ln(fund age) 102,962 4.888 0.894 1.099 7.006
flow 103,041 0.011 0.112 −0.294 0.804
expense 102,997 0.013 0.005 −0.005 0.170
turnover 97,675 0.852 1.256 0.000 91.500
TNA 106,232 1,254.47 5,252.73 1.001 195,806.90
Distance 103,604 0.213 0.060 0.115 1.057
Eigenvector 106,232 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.034
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Figure 2.1: Evolution of summary statistics.
This figure represents the time evolution on the top left of the number of actively managed U.S.
equity mutual funds in the sample from 1980:Q1 to 2016:Q4. On the top right is represented the
evolution of the total number of stocks held by these funds. On the bottom left we have the total
number of links or the sum of the network connections between all the funds for each quarter and
finally the total market value of equity holdings of the U.S. equity mutual funds.
2.2.1 Other Data
Following Franzoni and Schmalz (2017), I compute net fund flow of fund i at quarter
t as:
flowi,t =
TNAi,t − TNAi,t−1(1 +Reti,t)
TNAi,t−1
, (2.1)
where Reti,1 is the quarterly net return of fund i in quarter t. Due to the presence
of extreme values in CRSP as mentioned in Elton et al. (2001) I winsorize the net
fund flows at the 1% and 99% levels.
In the first set of results, I use other metrics of holdings concentration, namely active
share and tracking error. These are obtained from the author’s website (Cremers
and Petajisto 2009, Petajisto 2013).11
I also use the daily CBOE Volatility Index (V IX) which is available from 1990. I
compute the quarterly average V IX index and define a dummy variable whenever
the V IX is in the top 10th percentile. This results in episodes that include the
early 1990s recession, the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the 1998 Russian financial
crisis, the downturn following the Dot-com bubble, and the financial crisis of 2008
11http://www.petajisto.net/data.html
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for example. The use of a dummy is motivated by Cella et al. (2013) who use
a Turmoil dummy, also defined from the VIX index, that captures market-level
shocks. They find that institutional investors with a shorter trading horizon tend
to amplify shocks by creating price pressure on assets. Since the use of the V IX
index relates to the study of Cella et al. (2013), the related section of this chapter
follows their methodology.
For further tests at the stock level, I obtain firm characteristics from different
sources. I compute Amihud illiquidity ratio as the absolute value of firm j’s daily
stock return over the trading volume as reported by CRSP average over period t
(Amihud 2002). I obtain analyst average recommendation from I/B/E/S. From
Compustat, I compute asset growth, book-to-market ratio using the firm’s book
value, and the firm’s profitability.12 From CRSP, I obtain stock returns, compute
stock return volatility, and market capitalization.
2.3 Network Analysis
With mutual funds holdings data, I use network analysis to obtain cross-sectional
variations in holdings similarity. More specifically, I use the concept of centrality
that graph theory defines as the most important nodes in a network. In social
network analysis, central nodes are often associated to influential agents. Since the
network analysis based on mutual fund holdings does not rely on social connections,
a central fund will be defined as a mutual fund that is highly similar, in terms of
holdings, to its peers.
The starting point of this analysis is an adjacency matrix. This square matrix
g ∈ {0, 1}NxN is the representation of a given graph, where N = 5 for instance, such
as:
g =

0 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 1 0

Figure 2.2 shows the graph representation of the adjacency matrix g. First, we can
see that the matrix g is symmetric and have zeros on the diagonal. Second, the graph
12Book value is total shareholders’ equity (common plus preferred equity or assets minus li-
abilities) plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit minus the book value of preferred stock.
Profitability is the operating income before depreciation divided by assets from the previous period.
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Figure 2.2: Graph representation of matrix g.
in Figure 2.2 on page 14 shows the difference in terms of centrality. Node 2 is more
central in terms of degree/connections than the other nodes (4 edges compared to
the other nodes that have 3 edges). If each connection has a weight (i.e., the strength
of the link) this gives another dimension of cross-sectional variation.
The first challenge when applying network analysis in the setting of mutual fund
holdings is that the data do not represent a square holdings matrix. The raw data
can be defined by Wi,j,t, a bipartite matrix of holdings of mutual fund i in asset j
at quarter t in weights (dollar value over TNA).13 Following Gualdi et al. (2016), I
map this matrix Wi,j,t into a binary matrix Ai,j,t = sign(Wi,j,t) and project it into
a monopartite adjacency matrix (i.e., one type of node: mutual funds):
Oi,−i,t = Ai,j,tA′i,j,t − INt
Mt∑
j
A′i,j,t, (2.2)
where INt is the identity matrix of size Nt (the total number of mutual funds at
quarter t) and Mt is the total number of firms at quarter t. This standard projection
method allows us to obtain a mutual fund level portfolio overlap measure. Indeed,
Oi,−i,t is a square matrix where the entries represent the number of securities that
a given mutual fund i has in common with any other mutual fund −i but itself
(i.e., zeros on the diagonal). For instance, if O1,4,1984:Q3 = 20, it means that mutual
fund 1 and mutual fund 4 share 20 positions in common (among the Mt assets) in
the third quarter of 1984. This will give us a weighted undirected network where
the links between mutual funds will have an intensity/weight represented by the
portfolio overlap between two nodes/funds.
Figure 2.3 on page 19 shows , as an example, the first quarter of the sample where
red nodes represent mutual funds connected through portfolio overlap. The bigger
13A bipartite matrix is a network with two types of nodes, in this case mutual funds and firms.
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the red node is, the more common holdings it has.
2.3.1 Style Network
The previous section presented the network of all actively managed U.S. equity mu-
tual funds. However, as noted by Hoberg et al. (2017), it is relevant to investigate
the performance of a given fund relative to its rivals in terms of style dimension. I
refine the previous network by connecting mutual funds to their style-peers. This
gives style clusters within the complete network. I classify funds within their style
categories using data from Morningstar. Morningstar provides style classification for
each fund based on their holdings. Each fund is classified based on two dimensions:
size and book-to-market. For instance a large-value mutual fund is a fund with a
significant amount of holdings in large-cap and high book-to-market stocks. Morn-
ingstar is widely used as a style identifier by practitioners and is therefore suitable
for this part of the analysis (Teo and Woo 2004). I combine the original database
with Morningstar style information using both fund Tickers and CUSIPs (Pa´stor
et al. 2015).
2.3.2 Centrality
The next step in the analysis is to compute portfolio similarity measures at the
mutual fund level. The centrality measure will identify mutual funds that have
high or low holdings similarity with peers. It measures a node’s importance in
the network. A highly central fund has many positions overlapping with its peers
and hence is less likely to have an informational advantage about particular firms
according to the hypothesis tested in this chapter. In our network, the (weighted)
degree centrality of a fund will be the sum of its overlaps with each neighboring
node. More formally, we have:
Degreei,t =
Nt∑
−i
oi,−i,t, (2.3)
where oi,−i,t is the overlap of fund i with fund −i 6= i at quarter t. Degreei,t is the
sum of the elements of row i of matrix Oi,−i,t, defined in equation (2.2) on page 14,
and is the main measure of holdings similarity used in further analysis.
Other measures of centrality includes eigenvector centrality or betweenness central-
ity for instance. The eigenvector centrality looks at the importance of the nodes
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to which a given mutual fund is connected to (Bonacich 1987). Hence, this mea-
sures takes into account the second order of importance of centrality as pointed in
Hochberg et al. (2007). If you consider a mutual fund connected to only a couple of
other funds through common holdings, its degree centrality will be relatively low.
However, if it is connected to few mutual funds that are central themselves, then
eigenvector centrality will take this into account. More formally we have:
Eigenvectori,t =
1
λt
Nt∑
−i
oi,−i,te−i,t, (2.4)
where λt 6= 0 is a constant. Written differently we can notice that the eigenvector
centrality will be associated to the left eigenvector in a spectral decomposition and
λt as the largest eigenvalue of matrix Oi,−i,t:
λtet = Oi,−i,tet. (2.5)
Other measures I don’t consider include betweenness or closeness centrality for in-
stance. I compute eigenvector centrality for each mutual fund i at each quarter t to
test the robustness of centrality’s effect on mutual fund performance.
2.3.3 Distance Matrix
The previous methodology uses matrix Oi,−i,t for network analysis. However, it
was obtained from the binary matrix Ai,j,t where an element ai,j,t takes the value
1 whenever a fund i has a firm j in its portfolio. One potential concern with this
methodology is to capture spurious effects as a fund might invest a non-significant
amount in a given firm, yet takes the value 1 in matrix Ai,j,t defined in equation
(2.2) on page 14. To address this, I compute a distance matrix Di,−i,t from the
original holdings matrix Wi,j,t:
Di,−i,t =
√√√√Mt∑
j
(wi,j,t − w−i,j,t)2, (2.6)
where wi,j,t are elements of matrix Wi,j,t. Di,−i,t is a distance matrix that looks at
the square difference of weights invested in each asset j by any two mutual funds
i and −i. From this matrix, I compute a simple summary measure: the average
16
distance for each mutual fund with its peers:
Distancei,t =
1
Nt
Nt∑
−i
di,−i,t, (2.7)
where di,−i,t are elements of matrix Di,−i,t.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Degree Centrality and Fund Performance
In this section, I test the effect of degree centrality on mutual fund performance
using a regression approach. Controlling for fund characteristics, I run the following
predictive regression:
αi,t = β0 + β1Degreei,t−1 + γControlsi,t−1 + F + T + i,t−1. (2.8)
Degreei,t−1 is the main independent variable. The dependent variable, αi,t is the
fund’s abnormal performance. I estimate fund performance based on the CAPM
(market premium), Fama and French three factors (market premium, size, book-
to-market), and Carhart four-factor (market premium, size, book-to-market, and
momentum) models. I estimate factor loadings using rolling-window regressions
with 2 years of monthly data and use estimated betas to obtain the fund’s estimated
return for the next quarter.14 Then, αi,t is the difference between the realized fund
return and the estimated return obtained from the factor models. Controls include
fund flow, the natural logarithm of the number of stocks in the portfolio, fund size
(TNA), and fund age, as well as expense ratio, past return, turnover ratio, but also
other measures that predict performance such as active share or tracking error.
Table 2.2 on page 20 presents the results using a pooled OLS estimation approach
with time and fund fixed effects and standard errors clustered by fund.15 This
methodology accounts for potential residual correlations within funds and also pos-
sible time trends. I find that fund degree centrality coefficients are negative and
statistically significant at the 1% level in all specifications. For instance, column (1)
of Table 2.2 on page 20 shows a coefficient of -0.004 (t-stat= -9.20) for degree when
14The results remain throughout with a longer rolling-window of 6 years as in chapter 4.
15Clustering at the quarter-level or without fund fixed effects doesn’t affect the results.
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controlling for fund characteristics. This means that, holding other variables con-
stant, a one standard deviation increase in degree centrality (or a 7,087.88 increase
in degree centrality, which corresponds to one standard deviation as shown in Table
2.1 on page 11) leads to a reduction of fund quarterly performance by -0.4% for the
CAPM in column (1), -0.3% (t-stat= -8.94) for the Fama and French three-factor
model in column (4), and -0.2% (t-stat= -7.46) for the Carhart four-factor model in
column (7). Controls’ coefficients show that a higher number of stocks in a portfo-
lio, past fund returns, turnover ratio, and fund age tend to be positively associated
to fund performance. Fund size, on the other hand, has the opposite effect which
is consistent with a decreasing returns to scale hypothesis (Berk and Green 2004;
Chen et al. 2004).
18
Figure 2.3: Monopartite network.
This figure represents the monopartite network with the first quarter of the sample (1980:Q1) as
an example. Only links with a weight/overlap of at least 10 are represented.
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Degree centrality measures, in the context of common holdings network, the extent
to which a mutual fund is similar to its active peers. It can also capture a deviation
from the norm in a similar fashion as the active share measure does (Cremers and
Petajisto 2009).
I investigate the robustness of the main regression specification from Table 2.2 on
page 20 to the active share measure and tracking error. Active share is defined
as the sum of absolute differences between fund portfolio weights and benchmark
weights while tracking error is defined as the variance of the difference between the
fund portfolio return and the benchmark index return. Results show that degree
centrality’s coefficient is still negative and statistically significant when controlling
for active share. It shows that centrality in common holdings network captures other
relevant information missing in active share. When controlling for active share, a
one standard deviation increase in degree centrality leads a reduction of quarterly
fund performance (CAPM in column (2)) of -0.5% (t-stat= -6.24). The reduction
is of -0.3% (t-stat= -5.26) for the Fama and French three-factor model in column
(5) and -0.2% (t-stat= -4.05) for the Carhart four-factor model in column (8). The
coefficients are of similar magnitude when controlling for tracking error. In these
specifications the number of observations is lower as active share and tracking error,
obtained from the author’s website, stop in 2009. Fund characteristics’ coefficients
remain similar in these specifications.
2.4.2 Portfolio Disclosure
In this section, I investigate the impact of mandatory portfolio disclosure on fund
performance for mutual funds with low holdings similarity to test the hypothesis that
degree centrality relates to informational advantage. I used the mandatory portfo-
lio disclosure regulation introduced in May 2004 by the SEC. I test the following
specification:
∆αi,2004:Q4−2003:Q4 = β0+β1DegreeDummyi,2003:Q4+γControlsi,t−1+i,t−1. (2.9)
Following Agarwal et al. (2015), I define a dummy that takes the value 1 for mutual
funds in the bottom quartile of the degree centrality distribution in December 2003
(DegreeDummyi,t−1).16 The dependent variable is the change of abnormal perfor-
mance in the year 2004, which includes the change of regulation. Controls include
16Agarwal et al. (2015) define a dummy for top performing funds as mutual funds in the top
quartile of the distribution of fund performance in the prior year.
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fund characteristics, as described in section 2.4.1, measured as of December 2003
and standard errors are clustered at the fund level.
Table 2.3: Portfolio Disclosure
This table reports results of the analysis on portfolio disclosure. The dependent variables are the
changes of performance in the year when the SEC portfolio disclosure regulation was introduced
(2004), it is the change of annual performance between December 2004 and December 2003. In-
dependent variables are measured as of December 2003 and explained in the notes of Table 2.2.
DegreeDummy corresponds to a dummy when a fund was in the bottom quartile of degree centrality
distribution as of December 2003. Controls include TNA (in millions of dollars), which is total
net assets; Ret (annual fund net return); Flow (the net growth of total net assets); stocks (the
number of stocks in the portfolio); fund age (the number of months since the fund’s inception);
expense, and turnover. All specifications include an unreported intercept, and standard errors
are clustered at the fund level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively.
∆CAPMi,t−4:t ∆FF3i,t−4:t ∆FFC4i,t−4:t
(1) (2) (3)
DegreeDummyi,t−4 -0.051* -0.052* -0.067**
(-1.91) (-1.76) (-2.21)
Controls YES YES YES
# Obs 1,717 1,717 1,717
Adj R2 0.014 0.007 0.005
Table 2.3 on page 23 shows that mutual funds with low holdings similarity suffered
from the mandatory portfolio disclosure. Their performance decrease by −5.1 (t-
stat= -1.91, for the CAPM in column (1)) to −6.7% (t-stat= -2.21, for the Carhart
four-factor model in column (3)) following the introduction of the regulation.17 The
results presented in Table 2.3 on page 23 support the hypothesis of informational
advantage.
17The results remain the same if DegreeDummyi,t−1 is defined as mutual funds in the bottom
tercile, quintile, or decile of the degree centrality distribution.
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2.4.3 Style Degree Centrality and Fund Performance
So far I obtained mutual funds’ degree centrality within a common holdings network
composed of all U.S. active equity mutual funds. However, if an investor wants to
invest in small-growth firms via a mutual fund, it will be more suitable for him to
compare mutual funds within the same style category. In this section, I compute
degree centrality for each fund in its respective style category as defined Morningstar.
As for Table 2.2 on page 20, I run a predictive regression of fund performance on style
degree, controlling for fund characteristics. As in the previous analysis, I include
both fund and time fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the fund level. I
find in Table 2.4 on page 25 that a one standard deviation increase in style degree
centrality leads to lower fund performance of -0.5% (t-stat= -11.14) for the CAPM
model in column (1), -0.3% (t-stat= -10.46) for the Fama and French three-factor
model in column (2), and -0.3% (t-stat= -8.54) for the Carhart four-factor model in
column (3). The results suggest that comparing mutual funds with their style peers
is as relevant as a comparison with the whole active equity fund universe. It could
also be that links within the whole network are already representative of style links.
For example a large-value fund will have few or no connections with a small-growth
fund. Thus, the complete network and the style clusters are relatively similar as
results reported in Table 2.4 on page 25 suggest.18
2.4.4 Degree Centrality in Uncertain Times
I investigate the idea that mutual funds with high holdings similarity tend to un-
derperform even more at specific periods of market uncertainty as in Cella et al.
(2013). In a volatile period, some mutual funds might need to reduce their holdings
due to tracking error constraints for instance. The issue being that if many mutual
funds do it at the same time, this will create negative price pressure on commonly
held assets. A mutual fund with high degree centrality will be in further difficulties
as it shares many positions in common with its peers. Motivated by this mecha-
nism, I investigate the evolution of mutual fund degree centrality in periods of high
volatility and its effect on fund performance.
Table 2.5 on page 27 studies mutual fund degree centrality in uncertain markets
18In unreported results, I find the same negative effect of style degree on fund performance, when
fund’s style is defined by its holdings rather than the Morningstar style classification. For example,
if a fund holds at least 75% of its holdings of small-value stocks (defined using New York Stock
Exchange or NYSE breakpoints), then it is a small-value fund.
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Table 2.4: Style Degree Centrality and Fund Performance
This table reports the results of style network analysis using OLS regressions. The dependent
variable is fund performance at quarter t. Three models are used to compute performance: CAPM ,
Fama-French three-factor model (Fama and French 1993; FF3), and Carhart four-factor (Carhart
1997; FFC4). The independent variables are measured at quarter t − 1. The main independent
variable is StyleDegree. It is the weighted degree centrality of the style common holdings network.
Fund style is obtained from Morningstar where each mutual fund is categorized on the basis of size
and book-to-market dimensions of its holdings. Each mutual fund falls within one of nine-style
box (e.g., small-growth fund). The style common holdings network is composed only of mutual
funds of the same category. Controls include TNA (in millions of dollars), which is total net assets;
Ret (the quarterly fund net return); flow (the net growth of total net assets); stocks (the number
of stocks in the portfolio); fund age (the number of months since the fund’s inception); expense,
and turnover. All specifications include quarter and fund fixed effects, an unreported intercept,
and standard errors are clustered at the fund level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. All
continuous independent variables are divided by their sample standard deviations. ***, **, and *
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively.
CAPMi,t FF3i,t FFC4i,t
(1) (2) (3)
StyleDegreei,t−1 -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(-11.14) (-10.46) (-8.54)
Controls YES YES YES
FE YES YES YES
# Obs 84,037 84,037 84,037
Adj R2 0.819 0.887 0.910
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(as proxied by the Volatility index V IX) on fund performance. In Panel A, I
explore how degree centrality evolves in periods of high volatility. I define a dummy
that takes the value 1 whenever the V IX at quarter t is in the top decile of its
distribution over time. The use of a dummy is motivated by Cella et al. (2013)
who use a Turmoil dummy, also defined from the VIX index, that captures market-
level shocks. I regress degree centrality on the V IX dummy and find a positive
and statistically significant effect. The coefficient in column (1) is 0.025 (t-stat=
5.40) when controlling for fund characteristics and a year fixed effect and 0.055 (t-
stat= 16.25) when controlling for a fund × time fixed effect in column (2). This
second specification allows me to control for any time-varying fund characteristic
that could potentially affect degree centrality at the highly volatile quarter. In both
specifications, I cluster standard errors at the fund level.19 Figure 2.4 on page 28
also depicts how degree evolves around a highly volatile period. We can see from
this figure, where the right y axis represents the average degree centrality for all
funds, that degree tends to increase from period m− 6 (6 months before the highly
volatile event) until m+3 (three months after the event). The event in Figure 2.4 on
page 28 is the third quarter of 2008 (Lehman Brothers). This suggests that mutual
funds tend to move closer to each other in periods of high volatility. Based on this
evidence, I investigate the effect of degree centrality on cumulative abnormal fund
returns in the “surge” window (from quarter t− 2 until quarter t+ 1).
Panel B of Table 2.5 on page 27 shows that being a mutual fund with high degree
centrality, by one standard deviation, will lower your quarterly fund performance
by approximately -0.33 percentage points (t-stat=-1.74) for the Carhart four-factor
model (column (3)) around the volatile period, controlling for fund characteristics.
These results suggest that, while degree centrality is generally not beneficial for
fund performance, its negative effect is exacerbated in uncertain times as mutual
funds get rid of volatile firms due to asset management contract terms and thus
exercise negative price pressure on commonly held assets. This is consistent with the
documented inefficiencies and unintended consequences of institutional incentives
(Lines 2016).
19The results are robust to alternative dummy specification, i.e., top tercile, quartile, and quintile.
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Table 2.5: Degree Centrality in Uncertain Times and Fund Performance
This table reports the results of common holdings’ effects in uncertain times. In panel A,
the dependent variable is Degree measured at t. It is the weighted degree centrality of
the common holdings network. The main independent variable is V IX. It is a dummy
that takes the value 1 when the VIX index, in quarter t (event), is in the top decile of its
distribution. Other controls, measured at t, include TNA (in millions of dollars), which
is total net assets; Ret (the quarterly fund net return); flow (the net growth of total net
assets); stocks (the number of stocks in the portfolio); fund age (the number of months since
the fund’s inception), expense, and turnover. A quarter fixed effect is included in the first
specification and a fund × time fixed effect is included in the second specification with no
fund characteristics as controls. Standard errors are clustered at the quarter level. In panel
B, the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal fund return (CAR) in the window
period (between quarter t-2 to t+1). Three models are used to compute abnormal return:
CAPM , Fama-French three-factor model (Fama and French 1993; FF3), and Carhart four-
factor (Carhart 1997; FFC4). The main independent variable is Degree at time t. It is
the weighted degree centrality of the common holdings network. Controls are the same in
panel A. Panel B includes a fund fixed effect in all specifications. All specifications include
an unreported intercept and standard errors are clustered at the fund level. t-statistics are
reported in parentheses. All continuous independent variables are divided by their sample
standard deviations. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
confidence level, respectively.
Panel A: Degree in Uncertain Times
Degreei,t
(1) (2)
V IXt 0.025*** 0.055***
(5.40) (16.25)
Controls YES NO
FE Year Fund × Quarter
# Obs 79,624 83,257
Adj R2 0.481 0.956
Panel B: Performance in Uncertain Times
CAPMi,t−2:t+1 FF3i,t−2:t+1 FFC4i,t−2:t+1
(1) (2) (3)
Degreei,t -0.226** -0.337* -0.331*
(-2.19) (-1.84) (-1.74)
Controls YES YES YES
FE YES YES YES
# Obs 73,000 73,000 73,000
Adj R2 0.005 0.004 0.003
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Figure 2.4: Average degree around a volatile event
This figure represents the average (natural logarithm) degree centrality of the right y-axis around
a volatile event, which is defined as whenever the quarterly Volatility Index V IX (average monthly
V IX) is in the top decile of its distribution. In this figure, the representative event is the third
quarter of 2008 (Lehman Brothers).
2.4.5 Firm-level analysis
Owners’ Degree Centrality and Stock Returns
In this section, I explore the effects of mutual fund degree centrality at the firm
level. If mutual funds with low degree centrality have an advantage over their
peers with high holdings similarity, mimicking their portfolio should exhibit higher
returns. I investigate this aspect by constructing portfolios of stocks based the degree
centrality of their mutual fund owners. I sort funds based on degree centrality and
assign each fund in 10 groups at each quarter. I extract the holdings of each fund.
Then, I compute the rounded average degree centrality decile portfolio across all
funds for each stock (i.e., the simple average of all its owners’ degree centrality
decile). With ten portfolios of stocks based on the degree centrality of mutual fund
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owners, I construct a long-short portfolio where the long leg is on the low degree
centrality stocks and compute the abnormal returns of the top, bottom, and long-
short portfolios in the subsequent 12 months.
Table 2.6 shows the results of the univariate analysis at the firm level. The long-short
portfolio exhibit in column (6) an abnormal return of 7% (t-stat= 3.40) annually
with value-weighted portfolios, when abnormal return is obtained from the Carhart
four-factor model. The difference between bottom and top stocks based on owners’
degree centrality is almost 9% (t-stat= 4.37) for the three-factor model in column
(5). These results suggests that mutual funds with low holdings similarity own
stocks with higher abnormal returns. The results are weaker when forming equally-
weighted portfolios. The difference is of 1.5% (t-stat= 1.88) annually for the CAPM
in column (1) and 1.7% (t-stat= 2.27) for the three-factor model in column (2).
Table 2.6: Owners’ Degree Centrality and Stock Returns
This table reports annual abnormal returns for portfolios sorted by fund degree centrality. Each
quarter, mutual funds are sorted on the basis of degree centrality into ten portfolios. I extract
holdings from mutual funds in the top and bottom decile for each centrality measure and compute
equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolio returns composed of stocks owned by top and bottom
decile mutual funds as well as a long-short portfolio where the long leg is in stocks owned by mutual
funds with low degree. I regress returns of the top, bottom, and long-short portfolio returns in
the subsequent year on CAPM , three-factor (FF3) and four-factor (FFC4) models and report the
intercept of each model. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively.
Equally-weighted Value-weighted
CAPM FF3 FFC4 CAPM FF3 FFC4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 -0.006 -0.017* -0.000 0.205** 0.225*** 0.195***
(-0.39) (-1.62) (-0.08) (7.50) (9.97) (8.33)
10 -0.020* -0.033*** -0.008 0.136*** 0.139*** 0.125***
(-1.79) ( -4.21) (-1.06) (6.24) (7.45) (6.37)
1-10 0.015* 0.017** 0.008 0.070*** 0.086*** 0.070***
(1.88) (2.27) (0.89) (3.51) (4.37) (3.40)
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Owners’ Degree Centrality, Stock Returns, and Uncertain Times
Previous results show that mutual funds with high degree centrality suffer more in
uncertain periods. However, this does not directly show negative price pressure on
common assets or spillovers effects. To disentangle from common information at the
firm level that might make mutual funds sell assets, I investigate the effect of degree
centrality in uncertain periods at the stock level.
I compute degree centrality at the stock level as the value-weighted average of a
stock’s owners’ degree. Stocks with owners that have a high degree centrality should
exhibit more negative returns in uncertain periods if these mutual funds exercise
negative price pressure, controlling for firm characteristics. To verify this, I focus
on periods of uncertain markets defined as quarters where V IX is in the top decile
of its distribution as before and focus on the “surge period” as shown in Figure 2.4
on page 28 (i.e., from quarter t− 2 until quarter t+ 1).
Table 2.7 on page 31 shows the results of the effect of centrality in uncertain periods
at the stock level. A firm owned by mutual funds that are one standard deviation
higher in terms of degree centrality will have lower cumulative abnormal returns of
-0.5 percentage points (t-stat= -2.81) during the uncertain period for the CAPM
model in column (1). In this specification, I control for various firm characteristics
to exclude other explanations that might cause the stock to decrease in value (e.g.,
past return, analysts’ recommendation, illiquidity, stock return volatility), as well
as firm fixed effects.20 The results suggest that owners’ portfolio similarities have a
significant effect on stock returns in uncertain times. The results are weaker for the
Fama and French three-factor model in columns (3) and (4), and insignificant for
the Carhart four-factor model in columns (5) and (6). Including a firm fixed effect
also weakens the significance.
2.4.6 Further tests
In this section I investigate if the relationship between degree centrality and fund
performance still holds using alternative centrality and similarity measures. I first
choose eigenvector centrality as it takes into account a second order type of im-
portance within a network. Namely, a mutual fund with high eigenvector centrality
means that it is connected to mutual funds that also have many connections. In this
20These characteristics have been shown in prior literature to affect stocks returns (Banz 1981;
Rosenberg et al. 1985; Fama and French 1993; Jegadeesh and Titman 1993; Falkenstein 1996;
Haugen and Baker 1996; Barber et al. 2001; Amihud 2002; and Cooper et al. 2008).
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Table 2.7: Owners’ Degree Centrality, Stock Returns, and Uncertain Times
This table reports the results of common holdings’ effects for stocks in uncertain times. The
dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal stock return (CAR) in the window period (between
quarter t-2 to t+1). Quarter t is the period when the V IX is in the top decile of its distribution.
Three models are used to compute stock abnormal returns: CAPM, Fama-French three-factor
model, and Carhart four factor (Fama and French 1993; Carhart 1997). The main independent
variable is Degree at the stock level defined as the value-weighted average of a stock’s mutual
fund owners degree. Controls include Amihud illiquidity ratio, analyst average recommendation,
asset growth, book-to-market ratio (B/M ), firm size, profitability (profit), past stock return (Ret),
and stock return volatility (vol). All specifications include an unreported intercept, and standard
errors are clustered at the quarter level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. All continuous
independent variables are divided by their sample standard deviations. ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively.
CAPMj,t−2:t+1 FF3j,t−2:t+1 FFC4j,t−2:t+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Degreej,t -0.499*** -0.191 -0.142* -0.090 -0.545 -0.393
(-2.81) (-0.78) (-1.92) (-1.07) (-1.52) (-1.23)
Amihudj,t 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.09) (0.52) (0.46) (0.35) (0.12) (0.07)
analystj,t -0.002 -0.000 0.022 0.047 -0.056 -0.011
(-1.41) (-0.60) (0.46) (0.96) (-0.34) (-0.07)
assetj,t 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.107** 0.093** 0.292* 0.260*
(3.97) (3.70) (2.18) (2.05) (1.88) (1.78)
ln(B/M j,t) -0.006** -0.002 0.123 0.176* 0.430 0.574*
(-2.03) (-0.56) (1.20) (1.69) (1.19) (1.80)
ln(sizej,t) 0.007 0.019*** 0.476** 0.698** 2.061*** 2.682***
(1.43) (2.80) (2.23) (2.41) (2.86) (2.86)
profitj,t 0.001 0.001 -0.005 -0.014 0.008 -0.020
(0.99) (0.77) (-0.19) (-0.46) (0.08) (-0.18)
Retj,t 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.009 -0.034 -0.029
(1.24) (0.80) (0.22) (0.29) (-0.30) (-0.22)
volj,t -0.001 0.000 0.079 0.061 0.609 0.620
(-0.45) (0.04) (0.66) (0.35) (1.17) (0.82)
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Obs 151,651 151,651 151,651 151,651 151,650 151,650
Adj R2 0.903 0.903 0.880 0.880 0.841 0.841
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section, I use the same regression approach as in equation (2.8) on page 17 with the
same controls, including active share, fixed effects and clustered standard errors at
the fund level. When using eigenvector as a measure of mutual fund holdings simi-
larity, quarterly fund performance (CAPM) is lower by -0.1% (t-stat= -2.73) when
eigenvector centrality is changed by one standard deviation (see Table 2.8 on page
33). This effect disappears using other factor models (three-factor and four-factor).
The effect of eigenvector centrality is also present when computed in style networks
and its effect is also amplified in periods of uncertainty.
Then I use a distance measure that computes holdings similarity between mutual
funds using the proportion invested in each asset with respect to the size of the
fund.21 This methodology addresses the fact that I used dummies in the original
network; links were created whenever a mutual fund invests in a firm irrespective
of the amount. This serves as a robustness test to see if this binary network misses
information from the dollar proportion invested by each fund in each firm. Overall, I
find that the main hypothesis still holds. A larger distance of one standard deviation
leads to higher fund performance (a coefficient of 0.1% and t-stat= 2.73 for the
CAPM), controlling for fund characteristics. This effect disappears using other
factor models (Fama and French three-factor and Carhart four-factor). The distance
measure shows similar results when computed against style peers. However, distance
does not seem to show any negative impact in periods of high volatility.
The distance measure is less robust, typically when controlling for active share. A
possible reason is that if there are many closet indexing mutual funds (i.e., funds
that invest weights close to market weights), distance will be similar to computing
the active share of a mutual fund. Thus, it is less informative than a fund’s degree
as to how it differs from its peers.
Finally, I investigate the effect of degree centrality on fund performance in sub-
periods and sub-groups. I split the sample into two subperiods: before and after
the May 2004 SEC regulation that made portfolio disclosure mandatory for mutual
funds. I find that the effect is much weaker or absent in the post period. This
suggests that mutual funds with low holdings similarity potentially had an informa-
tional advantage as they held stocks disregarded by their peers. After the regulation,
mutual funds with low degree centrality lost their advantage as their holdings be-
came more frequently public. The effect of degree centrality on fund performance is
present among funds in the large stocks style category and growth stocks category.
21I compute the distance matrix from the bipartite network of mutual funds (See Section 2.3 for
more details on the distance measure).
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The absence of effect in the small and value style categories could be explained by
the large number of small stocks.
Table 2.8: Further Tests
This table reports further results of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is abnormal return
at quarter t. Three models are used to compute performance: CAPM , Fama-French three-factor
model (Fama and French 1993; FF3), and Carhart four-factor (Carhart 1997; FFC4). The main
independent variables are Eigenvector and Distance. Eigenvector is the eigenvector centrality of
the common holdings network. Distance is the Euclidean distance between each fund and its peers.
The distance matrix is computed from the matrix of dollar positions invested by each fund in each
asset divided by TNA. From the distance matrix, I compute fund-level distances as the average of
distances with all peers. When Style is specified, Eigenvector and Distance are measured with
respect to fund style peers as opposed to the whole active mutual fund universe. When VIX is
specified, the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return around the event quarter (when
VIX is in the top decile). Controls include TNA (in millions of dollars), which is total net assets;
Ret (the quarterly fund net return); flow (the net growth of total net assets); stocks (the number of
stocks in the portfolio); fund age (the number of months since the fund’s inception); expense, and
turnover. Pre (Post) -Disclosure corresponds the effect of Degree on fund performance in the sub-
period prior (post) to the May 2004 SEC regulation. The last four rows correspond to sub-groups
of funds according to their style category, as specified by Morningstar style box. All specifications
include an unreported intercept, and quarter and fund fixed effects, except for the uncertainty test
(V IX) where the specifications include a fund fixed effect only. Standard errors are clustered at
the fund level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. All continuous independent variables are
divided by their sample standard deviations. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively.
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CAPMi,t FF3i,t FFC4i,t Controls FE
Eigenvectori,t−1 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** YES YES
(-2.73) (-2.78) (-3.57)
Distancei,t−1 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001 YES YES
(2.73) (2.17) (1.61)
StyleEigenvectori,t−1 -0.001** -0.001** -0.000* YES YES
(-2.00) (-1.97) (-1.79)
StyleDistancei,t−1 0.020*** 0.015*** 0.011*** YES YES
(3.85) (3.60) (3.11)
Eigenvectori,t−1 (V IX) -0.181** -0.345** -0.372** YES YES
(-2.36) (-2.27) (-2.28)
Distancei,t−1 (V IX) 0.006 0.012 0.014 YES YES
(0.84) (0.86) (0.91)
Pre-Disclosure -0.011*** -0.008*** -0.006*** YES YES
(-4.76) (-4.43) (-3.80)
Post-Disclosure -0.002*** -0.001 0.001 YES YES
(-2.41) (-1.00) (1.09)
Large -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** YES YES
(-7.93) (-9.23) (-9.23)
Small -0.000 0.001 0.001 YES YES
(-0.06) (0.58) (0.95)
Growth -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.006*** YES YES
(-6.59) (-6.96) (-6.08)
Value -0.002 0.001 0.003** YES YES
(-1.16) (0.69) (2.44)
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, I build a holdings similarity measure from common holdings network
that captures informational advantage. I document that degree centrality is signif-
icantly associated to lower fund performance in a sample of actively managed U.S.
equity mutual funds from 1980:Q1 to 2016:Q4. This main result holds across alter-
native holdings similarity measure (e.g., eigenvector centrality, distance) or when
computed within style cluster networks.
Mutual funds face institutional constraints such as limited deviation from a bench-
mark. If facing a turbulent period, a fund manager will sell his volatile stocks in
order to respect his contract terms. This will create negative price pressure on assets
that are commonly held by many peers. Hence, a mutual fund with high holdings
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similarity suffers more in periods of high volatility.
This chapter complements the large literature in mutual fund performance and
its drivers. This new measure supports the idea that differences in mutual fund
performance might be driven by informational advantage. It also contributes to the
growing literature on asset management contracts that has highlighted the negative
effects and unintended consequences of benchmarking on asset prices for instance.
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Chapter 3
Do Experienced Returns Affect
Mutual Fund Managers’
Investment Decisions?
3.1 Introduction
In September 2015, the mutual fund Fidelity Advisors Growth Opportunities in-
vested approximately 1.6% of its capital in Microsoft, while at the same time
Calamos Growth Fund took a much larger bet in Microsoft, investing 3% of its
assets in this company. Such differences, which are common among mutual funds,
highlight that the signals used by mutual fund managers to actively allocate cap-
ital in excess of $15 trillion across U.S. equities are considerably heterogeneous.
What factors contribute to this heterogeneity? Are these factors indicative of stock-
picking skill? Do these factors have any general asset pricing implications? These
questions are central to the debate pertaining to active portfolio management and
stock market efficiency.
Previous studies show that differences in investment strategies across funds arise
because managers’ extract information from their own social network (Cohen et al.
2008; Gerasimova 2016), or from personal industry-related experiences (Kempf et al.
2016; Cici et al. 2018). Other studies highlight a preference of managers to invest
in companies that are situated close to them (Coval and Moskowitz 1999). We
add to this literature, examining whether managers’ investment decisions in specific
companies are affected by their firm-specific experienced returns.
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Our hypothesis is motivated from findings in behavioral economics, that people
view a random process more favorably if they experienced more positive outcomes
from this process in the past (Barron and Erev 2003; Ludvig et al. 2015). Such
findings are commonly attributed to reinforcement learning (Erev and Roth 1998;
Camerer and Ho 1999). Recent experimental work shows that the expectations held
by an individual about the payoffs of a specific asset are overly optimistic, if this
asset performed well for this individual in the past (Jiao 2017). Collectively, these
findings highlight that personal experience matters for decision-making under risk,
which suggests that reinforcement learning is a promising framework to analyze the
stock-level investment decisions of mutual fund managers. Our hypothesis is that
mutual managers will invest more heavily in a firm if their return experience with
this firm is better.
In our baseline analysis, the experienced return of a given manager with a specific
company is a weighted average of the past returns generated by this firm whilst
held by the manager, with weights decaying exponentially with time. This function
captures the well-known recency effect, whereby observations experienced in the
more recent past are more vividly recalled (e.g., Baddeley and Hitch 1993). To
determine the speed of decay, we follow a procedure similar to Malmendier and Nagel
(2011), estimating our model on a tightly spaced grid of different rates of decay,
and selecting the value that minimizes the model’s sum of squared residuals. Our
estimates suggest that the recency effect is not extreme, and that return experiences
in the distant past also influence investment decisions.
In a regression framework, controlling for various manager and firm characteristics
that may influence investment decisions (including past stock returns), we find that
a one standard deviation increase in experienced returns is associated with a 0.01%
(t-stat= 12.45) larger weight in this firm, relative to the size of the fund, which
constitutes 2.8% of the average weight on a stock in our sample. In economic terms,
this amounts to an increased investment of roughly $614K in this firm. When
aggregated across all stocks for each fund and each quarter, this estimate implies
that on average $30M worth of investments is allocated according to experienced
returns, which amounts to about 1.55% of the size of the average mutual fund. This
finding supports our hypothesis, that reinforcement learning affects the stock-level
investment decisions of mutual fund managers.
We conduct various robustness checks. For example, to ensure that our results are
not driven by an omitted variable related to either the firm or the fund, we also
estimate a model that includes firm × time and fund × time fixed effects. We
37
find that the coefficient on experienced returns continues to be positive and highly
significant in this model. We also conduct a placebo test with passively managed
index funds. Such funds provide an ideal setting for such a test, since their managers
are not trading based on their expectations about future stock returns. Therefore,
according to our hypothesis, the coefficient on experienced returns in this sample
should be statistically insignificant. We indeed find that it is (coefficient= -0.00,
t-stat= -0.40), which supports the view that our baseline results capture the effect
of experienced returns on the expectations and trades of actively managed mutual
funds.
Several studies argue that investors simplify their investment decisions assigning
stocks in specific categories, and engage in style investing (e.g., Barberis and Shleifer
2003; Teo and Woo 2004). Motivated by this observation, we examine whether
reinforcement learning affects investment decisions on the style level. We sort stocks
according to styles, based on various attributes such as market value or book-to-
market ratio, and examine whether the average weight placed on a stock in a given
style is positively related to managers’ style-level experienced returns. We find that
a one standard deviation increase in style-level experienced returns is associated with
an increased investment in firms that belong in this style by around 0.02% (t-stat=
4.93). When aggregated across stocks, this estimate implies that roughly 3.06%
of the assets of the average fund are allocated according to style-level experienced
returns.
We also estimate a model with an alternative definition of experienced returns based
on Malmendier and Nagel (2011), which allows managers with shorter tenure to ex-
hibit a larger recency effect. With this specification, we find that the effect of
experience returns on investment decisions is larger compared to our baseline case,
amounting to roughly 5.5% of the assets of the average fund being allocated accord-
ing to tenure-weighted experienced returns (or 8.8% when we use tenure-weighted
experienced returns to estimate the style-level model).
Experienced returns influence the way mutual fund managers rebalance their port-
folio in the presence of flows. Specifically, we find that when managers are faced
with inflows, they invest more of the new capital in stocks with higher experienced
returns. Similarly, when faced with outflows, they reduce their positions in stocks
with higher experienced returns less. These findings provide additional support to
our hypothesis, that managers are more inclined to invest in a specific firm, if their
experienced return with this firm is better.
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Does reinforcement learning in this context reveal stock-picking skills? If so, then
managers with better overall experienced returns are better stock pickers, and
thus their funds would earn higher returns going forward.1 Moreover, since stocks
with higher experienced returns receive larger weights in mutual fund portfolios,
information-based trading implies that experienced returns, when aggregated across
managers for a specific stock, constitute a profitable trading signal, which positively
predicts stock returns.
To test the managerial skill hypothesis, we aggregate experienced returns on the
fund level (AggExpRetFund) and examine whether it predicts future fund returns.
We find that the coefficient on AggExpRetFund is negative and significant, with a
one standard deviation increase in AggExpRetFund being associated with a 0.1%
reduction in fund returns. This result suggests that experienced returns not only do
not reflect managerial skill, but that they distort managers’ trades in a way that is
detrimental to fund performance. One possible distortion is that higher experienced
returns make managers more overconfident, which leads to more aggressive trading
behavior (Gervais and Odean 2001). We indeed find some support for this hypothe-
sis, as managers with higher AggExpRet tend to have higher turnover, active share
and tracking error.
A different distortion is highlighted by Kempf et al. (2016), who suggest that in-
vestors learn better when they experience negative return shocks. According to this
argument, managers with higher AggExpRet had relatively fewer learning oppor-
tunities, and thus make less profitable trades. To test this idea, we define separate
variables for positive and negative aggregate experienced returns (AggExpRet+Fund
and AggExpRet−Fund, respectively) and re-estimate the model. We find that, whereas
AggExpRet+Fund is insignificant, AggExpRet
−
Fund is negative and highly significant,
with a one standard deviation increase in AggExpRet−Fund being associated with
a 0.25% reduction in quarterly fund returns. This finding supports the argument
in Kempf et al. (2016), that the absence of negative return experiences distorts
managerial learning.
To test the “good” signal hypothesis, we aggregate experienced returns on the stock
level (AggExpRetFirm), and examine whether this variable predicts future earnings
shocks and stock returns. We find that AggExpRetFirm does not predict earnings
shocks or returns around earnings announcements. Moreover, in a portfolio setting,
1This conjecture assumes that investors do not allocate capital across funds according to ag-
gregate experienced returns (i.e., Berk and Green 2004). Note that experienced returns are not
directly observed by investors.
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we find that stocks with higher AggExpRetFirm underperform stocks in the opposite
of the spectrum by about 8% per year. This finding is in line with literature show-
ing that the trades of mutual fund managers can induce price pressure, and cause
misvaluations in the cross-section of stock returns (i.e., Coval and Stafford 2007;
Frazzini and Lamont 2008; Lou 2012; Akbas et al. 2015). In our setting, it is possi-
ble that stocks with higher aggregate experienced returns, which are overweighted
in mutual find portfolios, become over-priced. Conversely, stocks with lower expe-
rienced returns become under-priced. With the passage of time, as prices converge
to fundamental levels, the latter will outperform the former.
Our work contributes to the literature analyzing the subjective factors that influence
the trades of mutual fund managers. Along these lines, previous studies emphasize
the role of business and social connections (e.g., Ritter and Zhang 2007; Cohen
et al. 2008; Massa and Rehman 2008), as well as the importance of previous industry-
related experiences (e.g., Kempf et al. 2016; Cici et al. 2018). The factors highlighted
by these studies can be seen as information-based, since they are typically associated
with higher fund returns. Our work extends this literature, showing that the stock-
level investment decisions of mutual fund managers are affected by their firm-specific
experienced returns, consistent with reinforcement learning. However, contrary to
these studies, our results suggest that reinforcement learning distorts managers’
trades, since it is associated with lower fund returns.
Other studies examine whether mutual fund managers display any behavioral bi-
ases. For example, Bernile et al. (2017) show that managers who experience natural
disasters are less inclined to take on risk. Shu et al. (2017) show that the trades
of managers who experience bereavement due to parental loss are less profitable.
Akepanidtaworn et al. (2018) show that managers make profitable trades when they
buy stocks, but lose money when they sell, a finding they attribute to limited atten-
tion spent on sells. Bai et al. (2019) show that the birth of month of a fund manager,
which determines whether a manager starts school earlier, influences fund perfor-
mance. Our work extends this literature, showing that managers’ stock-specific
trades are affected by reinforcement learning. Moreover, on the manager level, re-
inforcement learning seems to cultivate overconfidence, which is damaging to fund
performance.
Our results also contribute to the literature on the effect of past experiences on the
economic decisions of various participants in financial markets, such as individual
investors (Kaustia and Knu¨pfer 2008; Malmendier and Nagel 2011), members of the
Federal Open Market Committee (Malmendier et al. 2017), and portfolio managers
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in credit markets (Chernenko et al. 2016). We extend this literature, showing that
mutual fund managers invest more heavily in stocks that generated better returns
for them in the past. This finding also contributes to the broader literature that dis-
cusses how investors’ stock return expectations are extrapolative (Lakonishok et al.
1994; Greenwood and Shleifer 2014; Da et al. 2018), highlighting a particular form
of extrapolation: investors form stock-specific return expectations by extrapolating
their own return experience with these firms.
Finally, our paper links to the literature on the potential of arbitrage to be “desta-
bilizing” to pricing efficiency (Stein 2009; Lou and Polk 2012; Huang et al. 2016).
A closely related study is by Akbas et al. (2015), who show that cross-sectional
mispricing is larger when mutual funds are more capitalized. The results from our
cross-sectional asset pricing tests add to this literature, showing that the experienced
returns of mutual fund managers, which determine the extent to which a stock is
overweighted or underweighted in mutual fund portfolios, can lead to mispricing
and cross-sectional return predictability.
3.2 Data & Methodology
In this section we describe our sample selection criteria, and define our variables
and econometric model.
3.2.1 Sample Specification
Our data come from different sources. The data on mutual fund size (total net as-
sets: TNA), fund age, and fund returns are from the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free U.S.
Mutual Fund database. The data on mutual fund holdings are from the Thomson
Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings database from 1980 to 2016. We group multiple
share classes and merge CRSP fund characteristics with mutual fund holdings using
MFlinks. The data on fund managers’ names and histories as well as fund style
categories are from Morningstar.
Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings data are given on a quarterly basis, start-
ing in 1980:Q1. We assign individual manager information to each fund and its
associated style category using Morningstar data, which start in 1991. We merge
CRSP and Morningstar data using funds’ Ticker first and subsequently using funds’
CUSIP for non-matched funds, following Pa´stor et al. (2015). We manually screen
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for potential typos in managers’ names. Overall, we match more than 80% of the
managers in the Morningstar sample to the CRSP database.
Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Lou 2012), we retain funds with a minimum fund
size of $1 million, and focus only on U.S. actively managed equity mutual funds.2
The data on firms’ market value, stock prices, and returns are from CRSP, and book
values are from Compustat. We exclude from our sample stocks in the bottom New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) size decile, or stocks with a price lower than $5 per
share, which tend to be avoided by mutual funds due to their potential illiquidity
(i.e., Falkenstein 1996). This filter is designed to mitigate any microstructural biases
associated with very small stocks, and is commonly used in empirical finance studies
(e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman 2001; Lou 2012).
In Section A of the Appendix, we explain in detail how we compute each of the
variables. Table 3.1 on page 47 summarizes the final database. We have 6,329
different managers for 2,054 mutual funds and 8,347 stocks from 1991:Q1 to 2016:Q4.
3.2.2 Experienced Returns
To measure the experienced return of the manager of fund i in firm j at quarter t,
we use an exponentially weighted moving average of past returns, as follows:
Experiencei,j,t =
T∑
k=0
(1− φ)kφRj,t−kI[wi,j,t−k>0], (3.1)
In the above expression, Rj,t−k is the return on firm j at period t − k. I[wi,j,t−k>0]
is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the manager of fund i invests in firm j
at time t − k and 0 otherwise (i.e., when the fund managed by this manager has a
positive weight on this stock wi,j,t−k > 0, where wi,j,t−k is the dollar amount invested
divided by the total net assets of the managed fund). In the sum, T indicates the
number of quarters since stock j was first purchased by the manager of fund i, where
2We select mutual funds with an investment objective code, as reported by the Thomson Reuters
Mutual Fund Holdings database, to be either aggressive growth, growth, growth and income, bal-
anced, or unclassified, excluding index funds. We also restrict funds to those that have a Morn-
ingstar Category Group of “U.S. Equity.”
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k indicates an arbitrary past quarter.3,4 This calculation in equation (3.1) on page
42 is done at the manager level, i.e., we calculate the experienced return of the
manager of fund i for firm j, regardless in which funds this manager has worked in
the past. Moreover, if fund i is managed by a team of managers (about 66% of our
sample), we take a tenure-weighted average of experienced returns in firm j at time
t, using the date that each manager first appeared in the Morningstar database to
estimate their tenure in the industry.5
The parameter φ in equation (3.1) on page 42 captures the rate of decay in the
weights attached on past return observations. It reflects the weight that is placed on
the most recent return observation, which then accordingly determines the weights
on all other past return observations. Drawing on the results of Malmendier and
Nagel (2011), we consider a function with decreasing weights (i.e., a recency effect
where the weight on the most recent observation is the highest), captured with the
parameter 0 < φ < 1. To illustrate, Figure 3.1 on page 44 shows various functions for
different values of φ. As φ gets closer to 1, the function gets steeper, indicating that
experienced returns are mostly affected by recent observations. As φ decreases, the
function becomes flatter, and the weight attached on more distant returns increases.
However, in all cases, the weight attached on the most recent experiences is higher,
consistent with a recency effect on mental representations.
Because there is no theoretical guidance on what φ should be, we estimate it from the
data using a procedure similar to that in Malmendier and Nagel (2011). Specifically,
we estimate our model described below on a tightly spaced grid of different values
for φ, which correspond to different experienced return specifications, and retain the
version that minimizes the regression’s sum of squared residuals.6
3In the period that a stock was first purchased k=T , and k = 0 indicates the current time period,
t. Note that with this specification, we assume that each stock provides its return during the full
quarter that it is held by a fund, which implies that it was bought at the closing price at the end
of the previous quarter.
4Note that, if a fund manager held a stock at some point in the past, then completely sold it,
and then bought it again at a later date, our experienced returns measure assigns a value of zero
to the intermittent periods that the stock was not held.
5This specification assumes that managers with larger tenure are more senior, and therefore
influence investment decisions more strongly. However, our results are robust to using an equally-
weighted average instead.
6For a fixed value of φ, the model is linear in its parameters, and can thus be estimated using
ordinary least squares.
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Figure 3.1: Experience decay factor
This figure shows the weights on past returns for the exponentially weighted moving average for
different values of the decay parameter φ.
3.2.3 Model Specification
The dependent variable in our models is the weight placed on firm j by fund i
at quarter t, wi,j,t, defined as the dollar amount invested divided by the total net
assets of the managed fund. Such a measure is commonly used when studying the
investments decisions of mutual fund managers (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz 1999;
Cohen et al. 2008; Gerasimova 2016). Because wi,j,t changes as the market value
of firm j changes, we adjust it following the method in Kacperczyk et al. (2005),
to capture the “active” investment decision by the manager of fund i on firm j, as
follows:
Weightadji,j,t = wi,j,t − w˜i,j,t, (3.2)
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where
wi,j,t =
$holdingi,j,t
TNAi,t
and w˜i,j,t =
wi,j,t−k
∏K
k=0(1 +Rj,t−k)∑
j wi,j,t−k
∏K
k=0(1 +Rj,t−k)
.
The variable w˜i,j,t reflects the weight that fund i would place on firm j at time t
had this fund bought this stock in the past (at time t − K) and never traded it.
Therefore, the adjustment shown in equation (3.2) on page 44, subtracts from the
weight on firm j the hypothetical buy-and-hold weight reflecting the variation in
firm j’s value over time, thus capturing the manager’s active investment decision in
this firm (Weightadj).
Note that, in our estimations, if a specific stock is not held by a mutual fund manager
at a given quarter, it does not enter in our estimations for that specific fund for that
quarter, i.e., it does not receive a weight of zero.7 In our setting, stocks that were
never held by a manager would also have zero experienced returns, so entail no
variation than can be used to test our hypothesis.
Equation (3.3) below is our baseline model:
Weightadji,j,t = c+ βExperiencei,j,t−1(φ) + γFundControli,t−1 (3.3)
+ δF irmControlj,t−1 + S × T + i,j,t.
In terms of fund-level controls, our models include fund alpha with respect to the
Carhart four-factor model (fund alpha; Carhart 1997), fund flows (flow, calculated
as the percentage change between two quarters of total net assets after taking into
account fund returns), the natural logarithm of fund age (ln(fund age), calculated as
the number of months since fund inception), and the natural logarithm of the total
net assets (ln(TNA)) of the fund. To control for the fact that funds invest in firms
with different market values (MV ) and book-to-market (B/M ) ratios according to
their designated style, we control for the variable %Style, proposed by Cohen et al.
(2008), calculated as the portion of a fund’s TNA invested at quarter t − 1 in the
style in which firm j belongs, depending on its MV and B/M ratio.8 We also control
for fund turnover (turnover), calculated as the minimum of the absolute values of
7Note that in our descriptive statistics table, the indicated minimum weight of 0 is just a rounded
value of a very small positive weight.
8To classify firms into styles, we use NYSE breakpoints on firm size (MV ) and B/M ratios. For
each quarter, firms in the bottom (top) 30th (70th) MV percentile are classified as small (large)
stocks. Firms in the bottom (top) 30th (70th) B/M percentile are growth (value) stocks. Firms
in-between the 30th-70th percentiles for MV (B/M ) are classed as mid-size (blend).
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sales and purchases of securities in a quarter, divided by the total net assets of fund
i, as in Wermers (2000) and Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004). Manager tenure is
the number of months since the first appearance in the Morningstar database. For
team-managed funds, manager tenure is an equally-weighted average of the tenure
of each manager. The dummy variable team equals 1 if fund i is managed by a team
of managers and 0 otherwise.
We also include in the model fund style × time fixed effects, denoted in equation
(3.3) on page 45 by S×T . We use the Morningstar classification to assign funds into
styles, where a fund can belong in one of nine styles (3×3, according to MV and
B/M orientations). Thus, S × T equals 1 if fund i at quarter t belongs in a specific
style category. These fixed effects capture aggregate shocks that may influence the
investment decisions of managers, due to factors such as correlated capital inflows
or outflows (e.g., Teo and Woo 2004).
At the firm level, in our models we control for the natural logarithm of firm MV and
book-to-market ratio B/M , and four lags of past quarterly stock returns (rett−k,
where k ∈ {1, .., 4}). Moreover, to account for any correlation in the residuals for
the same firm at a given time, in all our models we cluster standard errors at the
firm × time level. All the independent variables in the model enter on a lagged
basis.
Table 3.1 on page 47 provides descriptive statistics for the different variables. On
average, we have 1,899 firms and 925 funds per quarter, with roughly 79 funds
investing in each firm. There are more large-cap funds, than mid-cap and small-cap
funds. On average, the weight placed on a firm, wi,j,t, is 0.64% relative to fund TNA
and 0.39% for the adjusted weight. Our experienced returns measure (with φ = 0.3)
is equal to 4% on average, with a standard deviation of 9%.
The average fund in our sample has an average quarterly return of 2%, an α of
-0.98%, a TNA of around $5,578M, is 15 years old, with a flow of 2%, and an annual
turnover ratio of 80%. These statistics are comparable to studies that use this
data (e.g., Agarwal et al. 2015; Doshi et al. 2015; Pa´stor et al. 2015). On average
each manager in our sample has a tenure of 10 years. Table 3.2 on page 48 shows
correlations for the main variables, namely Experience, fund alpha, flow, fund age,
TNA, %Style, turnover, manager tenure, team, MV , B/M , and four lags of stock
returns (ret). As expected, the highest correlations are between experienced returns
and lagged stock returns. For this reason, our model controls for past stock returns
at different lags.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics of our main variables. The sample is composed of actively
managed mutual funds in the U.S. from 1991:Q1 to 2016:Q4. Data on fund manager names and
histories, and data on fund styles are from Morningstar. Firm-level data are from CRSP and
Compustat, and fund-level data are from the CRSP Survivorship-Bias-Free U.S. Mutual Fund
database and Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings database. Variable definitions are in Table
A1 in the Appendix. The experienced returns measure (Experience) is calculated assuming a decay
parameter φ equal to 0.3.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max P25 P50 P75
Panel A: Observations
Firms by quarter 1899.3 182.9 1022 2336 1798 1904 2007
Funds by firm & quarter 78.79 63.14 1 410 34 60 106
Funds by quarter 925.16 235.74 134 1223 892 978 1059
Large blend 175.77 41.47 31 234 165 184 198
Large growth 202.58 48.51 42 267 191 213 232
Large value 130.96 34.33 19 182 122 136 155
Mid blend 53.3 16.75 4 76 47 58 65
Mid growth 97.31 24.22 21 129 96 102 113
Mid value 37.07 13.23 1 55 31 39 48
Small blend 79.57 25.67 3 110 71 82 102
Small growth 105.3 27.31 8 138 102 114 121
Small value 43.3 13.35 3 56 41 49 53
Panel B: Fund characteristics
Weight (%) 0.64 0.79 0 4.31 0.07 0.3 0.94
Weightadj (%) 0.39 0.77 -11.89 4.31 -0.04 0.08 0.62
Experience (φ=0.3) 0.04 0.09 -0.42 0.76 -0.01 0.03 0.08
Large blend 0.03 0.07 -0.36 0.68 0 0.03 0.07
Large growth 0.04 0.08 -0.36 0.69 0 0.04 0.08
Large value 0.03 0.07 -0.42 0.7 -0.01 0.03 0.06
Mid blend 0.03 0.07 -0.36 0.68 0 0.03 0.07
Mid growth 0.04 0.08 -0.36 0.69 0 0.04 0.08
Mid value 0.03 0.07 -0.42 0.7 -0.01 0.03 0.06
Small blend 0.03 0.07 -0.36 0.68 0 0.03 0.07
Small growth 0.04 0.08 -0.36 0.69 0 0.04 0.08
Small value 0.03 0.07 -0.42 0.7 -0.01 0.03 0.06
fund alpha (%) -0.98 0.12 -14.96 15.06 -1.02 -0.97 -0.92
flow 0.02 0.14 -0.5 1.96 -0.03 0 0.04
fund age 185.98 158.31 1 1106 85 147 230
TNA 5577.79 27,024.28 1.1 498,117.1 165.4 576.5 1927.89
%Style 36.7 24.17 0 175.95 15.22 34.39 57.35
turnover 0.8 0.8 0 1.11 0.2 0.7 0.94
manager tenure 114.83 69.88 0 336 60 106.5 162
fund return 0.02 0.09 -0.81 0.92 -0.02 0.03 0.08
Panel C: Firm characteristics
MV 5281.07 19,956.85 11.32 724,773.4 409.05 1012.72 3013.1
B/M 0.09 0.24 0 14.23 0.03 0.05 0.08
Ret 0.04 0.18 -0.9 12.64 -0.06 0.04 0.13
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3.3 Results
In this section we present our baseline results and various robustness checks. More-
over, we conduct some additional tests related to our hypothesis.
3.3.1 Baseline Model
Table 3.3 on page 50 shows the results. We introduce the control variables sequen-
tially. In line with the reinforcement learning hypothesis, we find that the coefficient
on experienced returns is positive and highly significant. As shown by column (4),
where the regression includes the full set of controls, a one standard deviation in-
crease in experienced returns in a firm leads to a larger active investment in it equal
to 0.01% (t-stat= 12.45), which corresponds to roughly $0.6M.
As shown in column (4) of Table 3.3 on page 50, the rate of decay φ is equal to 0.24,
which suggests that the recency effect is not extreme, and that returns experienced
further back in time also influence investment decisions. A similar finding is reported
by Malmendier and Nagel (2011), who study the effect of experienced market returns
on the decisions of households to invest in equities.
In terms of firm controls, the coefficients on MV and B/M are positive and signif-
icant, indicating that fund managers, on average, prefer large stocks, perhaps for
their higher liquidity, and stocks with higher B/M ratios, which have lower price
multiples and tend to yield a value premium. The coefficients on lagged stock returns
are all positive and significant, indicating that fund managers trade on momentum,
consistent with the results in Carhart (1997).
3.3.2 Robustness Checks
We discuss various robustness checks in this subsection, with the results shown in
Table 3.4 on page 51. For the first test, we examine whether our results capture the
effect of an omitted variable, in either the fund or the firm. We do so by replacing
firm-level controls with a firm × time fixed effect, which controls for all information
about a specific firm that is common to all managers. Moreover, we replace all
fund-level controls with a fund × time fixed effect, which controls for time-varying
manager characteristics, such as risk aversion or “sentiment.” In column (3) of Table
3.4 on page 51 we present the results when both these fixed effects are included
in the model, and find that the coefficient on experienced returns is positive and
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Table 3.3: Experienced Returns and Investment Decisions
This table presents the results of the effect of experienced firm returns on investment decisions.
The dependent variable is Weightadji,j,t. The main independent variable is Experience. When a fund
is team-managed, we take a tenure-weighted average of Experience in firm j by each manager,
where tenure is based on the date that each manager first appeared in the Morningstar database.
We estimate the model on a tightly spaced grid of different values of Experience, corresponding to
different decay parameters (φ), and select the model that minimizes the regression’s sum of squared
residuals. For definitions of the variables, see Table A1 in Appendix. All specifications include a
fund style × time fixed effect and an unreported intercept. Standard errors are clustered by firm
× time. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. All continuous independent variables are divided
by their sample standard deviations. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% confidence level, respectively.
Weightadji,j,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Experiencei,j,t−1 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.008*** 0.011***
(18.56) (14.79) (13.17) (12.45)
Fund Controls
fund alphai,t−1 -0.014*** -0.012***
(-17.56) (-15.74)
flowi,t−1 0.004*** -0.001***
(9.84) (-3.36)
ln(fund agei,t−1) 0.130*** 0.107***
(216.52) (205.34)
ln(TNAi,t−1) -0.172*** -0.146***
(-272.89) (-293.97)
%Stylei,j,t−1 0.098*** -0.043***
(68.55) (-36.21)
turnoveri,t−1 0.038*** 0.002***
(66.57) (3.98)
manager tenurei,t−1 0.022*** 0.017***
(43.89) (34.69)
teami,t−1 -0.030*** -0.023***
(-37.78) (-31.21)
Firm Controls
ln(MV j,t−1) 0.361*** 0.398***
(147.67) (130.18)
ln(B/M j,t−1) 0.161*** 0.162***
(89.69) (78.22)
retj,t−1 0.022*** 0.009***
(24.78) (9.43)
retj,t−2 0.015*** 0.003**
(17.18) (2.51)
retj,t−3 0.016*** 0.004***
(14.48) (3.42)
retj,t−4 0.010*** 0.004***
(12.40) (4.03)
Fixed Effects Style x Time Style x Time Style x Time Style x Time
Parameter 0.34 0.40 0.19 0.24
#Obs 6,771,424 5,294,297 6,672,128 4,576,988
Adj R2 0.093 0.155 0.189 0.240
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significant (0.005, t-stat= 9.56).9 Overall these results suggest that our findings are
not capturing the effect of an omitted firm- or fund-level variable.
Table 3.4: Robustness Checks
This table presents the results of different regressions, following the procedures explained in the
notes for Table 3. In the regression for column (1), we replace all fund controls with a fund
× time fixed effect. In the regression for column (2), we replace all firm controls with a firm
× time fixed effect. In column (3) we replace all fund and firm controls (except %Style) with
these fixed effects. In the regression for column (4), the dependent variable is the percentage
change in shares held by manager i in stock j from quarters t − 1 to t, adjusted for stock splits
(ChangeShares). In the regression for column (5), our baseline model includes with Weightadji,j,t
as the dependent variable in a sample of index funds (as indicated in the Morningstar database).
For definitions of the variables, see Table A1 in Appendix. All regressions include an unreported
intercept. Standard errors are clustered by firm × time. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
All continuous independent variables are divided by their sample standard deviations. ***, **, and
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level respectively.
Active Passive
Weightadji,j,t ChangeSharesi,j,t Weight
adj
i,j,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Experiencei,j,t−1 0.017*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.003*** -0.000
(20.98) (6.35) (9.56) (8.11) (-0.07)
Fund Controls YES NO NO YES YES
Firm Controls NO YES NO YES YES
Fixed Effects Firm x Time Fund x Time Fund x Time Style x Time Style x Time
Fixed Effects Firm x Time
Parameter 0.28 0.19 0.25 0.07 0.09
# Obs. 5,282,186 6,671,751 6,761,640 5,254,100 1,274,938
Adj R2 0.304 0.578 0.616 0.019 0.083
We estimate our baseline model of equation (3.3) on page 45 using the percentage
change in the number of shares held in firm j by fund i from quarter t−1 to quarter
t, ChangeShares, as the dependent variable. This variable, since it is not affected by
variations in the value of firm j, is an alternative way to capture managers’ active
investment decisions. Using our baseline specification from equation (3.3) on page
45, we find in column (4) of Table 3.4 that the coefficient on experienced returns is
positive and significant (0.003, t-stat= 8.11).
In additional robustness checks, we estimate our baseline model using the un-
adjusted weight placed on a given stock (wi,j,t), or using market-adjusted stock
returns to estimate experienced returns. In both cases our key results continue
to hold. For brevity we do not report these results, which are available from the
9In these models we include the variable %Style, since it not subsumed by time varying firm or
fund fixed effects.
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authors on request.
Our next robustness check is a placebo test using the investment decisions of the
managers of index funds. The trades of such managers aim to replicate specific
stock indices, and so are not based on expectations about future stock returns.10
Therefore, in this sample, we expect that the coefficient on experienced returns is
statistically insignificant. The results in column (5) of Table 3.4 on page 51 show that
the coefficient on experienced returns is indeed statistically insignificant (-0.000, t-
stat= -0.07), a finding which provides support to our claim that our baseline findings
capture the effect of experienced returns on the stock return expectations of active
mutual funds’ managers.
3.3.3 Additional Tests
In this section we examine whether our findings are different for team-managed vs.
single-manager funds, or depend on managerial tenure.
Individual vs. team-managed funds
Many of the funds in our sample are managed by teams of managers, and for our
analysis the experienced return of the manager of fund i reflects a tenure-weighted
average of these managers’ experienced returns for firm j. However, our findings may
differ for team-managed funds. One view, according to the “wisdom of crowds,”
suggests that groups make better decisions. Assuming that experienced returns
do not carry any value-relevant information, this view suggests that group-managed
funds would maintain a more forward-looking perspective, and thus display a weaker
experienced returns effect.11 However, research in psychology suggests that the
opposite may also be true. For example, Kahneman and Tversky (1973) show that
people become more confident about a certain opinion when faced with multiple
signals that support it. This is because people use a simple “counting heuristic,”
and do not fully process the extent to which the signals are correlated. In our
setting, this finding might predict a stronger effect for team-managed funds, where
different managers discuss their (correlated) views on the same stocks.
To examine whether team size matters, we estimate our baseline model of equation
10We identify index funds using the relevant indicator from Morningstar.
11In section 4.1 we conduct tests to examine whether experienced returns reflect value-relevant
information. We do not find any evidence to support this view.
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(3.3) on page 45 while interacting the experienced returns variable with the dummy
variable team. The results are shown in Table 3.5 on page 55. In column (1),
the coefficient on experienced returns, which amounts to single-manager funds, is
0.009 (t-stat= 9.00). The corresponding coefficient for team-managed funds is 0.012
(= 0.009 + 0.003), and the incremental effect is statistically significant (t-stat=
3.78). We conduct an additional test, whereby we split team-managed funds into
two groups (cutting at the median) according to the number of managers, and then
estimate our baseline model of equation (3.3) on page 45 separately in each group.
The results in Table A.3 in the Appendix show that the coefficient on experienced
returns for the high number of managers group is 0.017 (t-stat= 15.01), whereas
for the small number of managers group it is 0.013 (t-stat= 10.29). The difference
between these coefficients is statistically significant. Collectively, these results are in
line with the view that experienced returns are more influential for team-managed
funds.
Managerial Tenure
Thus far our results reflect the effect of experienced returns using a decay factor φ
that best fits the data across all managers. However, managers with more experience
in the industry may have a “longer” memory, and thus display a weaker recency ef-
fect. Indeed, Malmendier and Nagel (2011) show that older households have longer
memories of stock market returns. To examine whether managerial tenure influences
the effect of experienced returns, we construct an alternative tenure-weighted expe-
rienced return measure (TW-Experience) based on Malmendier and Nagel (2011),
as follows:
TW-Experiencei,j,t =
tenurei,t−1∑
k=1
ωi,t(k, θ)Rj,t−kI[wi,j,t−k>0], (3.4)
where
ωi,t(k, θ) =
(tenurei,t − k)θ∑tenurei,t−1
k=1 (tenurei,t − k)θ
.
With this specification, the rate of decay is captured by θ, where θ > 0 captures
the recency effect. The variable tenurei,t reflects the experience of the manager of
fund i in the mutual fund industry, and is calculated based on the first date that
this manager appears in the Morningstar database. TW-Experience implies that
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managers with shorter tenure will exhibit a larger recency effect. To illustrate, in
Figure 3.2 we plot the weights attached on past experienced returns, by a manager
with 24 quarters of experience, and another with 8 quarters of experience, assuming
that θ = 2.8. As seen from Figure 3.2, the junior manager puts a higher weight
on more recent observations, relative to the more senior manager.12 As θ increases,
both managers would demonstrate a stronger recency effect, but in all cases the
more senior manager would exhibit weaker recency. As in our baseline analysis, we
estimate our model on a tightly spaced grid for different values of θ, and select the
model that minimizes the regressions sum of squared residuals.
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Figure 3.2: TW-Experience decay factor
This figure shows the weights on past returns for our tenure-weighted experienced return measure
(TW-Experience) based on Malmendier and Nagel (2011) with decay parameter θ=2.8. We compare
two managers with two years of tenure (junior) and a manager with six years of tenure (senior).
The results are shown in columns ((2)-(4)) in Table 3.5 on page 55. For this estima-
tion we used a grid of θ values between -1 and 5, where θ = 0 reflects the case where
there is no “time”-related effect on the way returns are coded in memory, and thus
12We can also note from Table 2 that, as expected, manager tenure has a strong positive cor-
relation with TW-Experience, while its correlation with our measure Experience of equation (1) is
close to zero.
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experienced return just reflects the simple average return for a specific stock since
time of purchase. Since our results indicate that a θ > 0 best explains the data,
this estimation provides evidence that a recency effect does influence the mental
representation of experienced returns.13
Consistent with our previous results in Table 3.3 on page 50, we find that the
coefficient on TW-Experience is positive and significant, ranging from around 0.02%
to 0.04%, depending on the specification. The larger coefficient obtained in this case
relative to our baseline results in Table 3.3 on page 50, especially when allowing for
time-varying firm and fund fixed effects, suggests that junior managers display a
stronger recency effect compared to more senior managers.
Table 3.5: Experience, Teams, and Tenure
This table presents the results of the effect of experienced returns on investment decisions for team-
managed funds and managers with different tenure, following the procedures explained in the notes
for Table 3.3. The dependent variable is Weightadji,j,t. In the regression for column (1), we estimate
our baseline model while interacting Experience with a dummy that flags team-managed funds.
In the regressions for columns ((2)-(4)), we use an alternative measure for experienced returns,
following Malmendier and Nagel (2011), which allows managers with shorter tenures to exhibit a
stronger recency effect (TW-Experience). For definitions of the variables, see Table A1 in Appendix.
All specifications include an unreported intercept. Standard errors are clustered by firm × time.
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. All continuous independent variables are divided by their
sample standard deviations. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
confidence level respectively.
TW-Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Experiencei,j,t−1 0.009*** 0.015*** 0.043*** 0.039***
(9.00) (20.75) (57.70) (82.13)
Experiencei,j,t−1x Teami,t−1 0.003***
(3.78)
Teami,t−1 -0.024***
(-30.31)
Fund Controls YES YES NO NO
Firm Controls YES YES YES NO
Fixed Effects Style x Time Style x Time Fund x Time Fund x Time
Fixed Effects Firm x Time
Parameter 0.33 2.8 2.2 2.6
# Obs. 5,254,116 5,254,100 6,671,708 6,761,469
Adj R2 0.241 0.372 0.579 0.632
13Our estimate of θ is around 2.5, which is larger than the 1.5 reported by Malmendier and
Nagel (2011), who analyze how memories of a single asset (i.e., the stock market return) affect
future stock market participation decisions. In our setting, we model managers’ investments and
memories over many individual stocks, a setting where the recency effect can be stronger due to
memory constraints.
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3.3.4 Changes in Shares Held and Response to Flows
In this subsection we examine whether managers, when faced with capital inflows
or outflows, rebalance their portfolios according to their experienced returns from
different stocks. Following Lou (2012), we use the following regression specification:
ChangeSharesi,j,t = α+ βExperienceDummyi,j,t−1 (3.5)
+ γExperienceDummyi,j,t−1 × flowi,t + δControli,j,t−1
+ S × T + i,j,t,
where ChangeShares is the percentage change in the number of shares held in firm
j by fund i from quarter t − 1 to t. As in Lou (2012), we estimate the model
separately for outflow and inflow funds. With this specification the coefficient on
flow indicates whether managers buy or sell shares proportionately when faced with
inflows or outflows.14
We include an experienced returns dummy variable (ExperienceDummy) in the
model that equals to 1 if fund i is in the top 33%, 25%, or 20% in the distribution of
experienced returns for firm j at time t−1. The key variable of interest in this model
is ExperienceDummy × flow, an interaction variable that examines whether ex-
perienced returns influence how managers expand or liquidate their positions when
faced with inflows or outflows. If experienced returns influence this decision accord-
ing to reinforcement learning, the coefficient on the interaction variable should be
positive for the inflow sample, and negative for the outflow sample.15
In the model, we also include three control variables, following the analysis of Lou
(2012). Specifically, we control for own, the percentage of shares outstanding of
firm j that is held by the manager of fund i at the end of quarter t − 1; illiq, the
absolute value of the firm j’s daily stock return over the trading volume as reported
by CRSP, averaged over quarter t−1 (Amihud’s illiquidity ratio); and an interaction
of these variables with flow. As in our baseline regression of equation (3.3) on page
45, we include time-varying style fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the firm
14For example, a coefficient on flow equal to 1 for the inflow (outflow) sample indicates that
all existing shares are scaled up (down) proportionately after capital additions (withdrawals). If
the coefficient is less than 1 for the inflow sample, then this means that some new money go
toward scaling up existing stocks, and some toward buying new stocks or toward increasing cash
holdings. Similarly, for the outflow sample, a coefficient less than 1 implies that funds partly finance
redemptions using their cash holdings.
15We express the effect of experienced returns using a dummy variable because with this specifica-
tion the coefficient on the interaction term can be interpreted as dollar deviations from proportional
changes in holdings due to experienced returns.
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× time level.
The results are shown in Table 3.6 on page 58. In line with our previous results,
the coefficient on the experienced return dummy is positive and significant for both
samples, and increases monotonically as the dummy captures higher experienced
returns, ranging from 1.7% to 4.6%. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the
coefficient on the interaction between the ExperienceDummy and flow is negative
for the outflow subsample and positive for the inflow subsample. For example, the
results in column (2) suggest that for every dollar of outflow, managers are less
willing to sell shares in stocks with high experienced returns, by about 5 cents (t-
stat= -3.74). Similarly, the results in column (5) suggest that for every dollar of
inflow, managers are more willing to buy shares in stocks with higher experienced
returns, by about 5 cents (t-stat= 6.57).
3.3.5 Style-Level Experience
In this subsection, we examine whether experienced returns affect investment deci-
sions based on the style level of the fund.
The first style categorization is based on Teo and Woo (2004), who sort stocks
into nine MV and B/M portfolios (3×3).16 We use size and book-to-market cate-
gorizations as they have been demonstrated to matter to investors (Kumar 2009).
Moreover, Morningstar itself classifies funds according to these dimensions, thus
further strengthens this type of categorization in the market. For our second style
classification, we assign firms into one of the 125 portfolios based on MV, B/M,
and return momentum, as proposed by Daniel et al. (1997) (DGTW). This cate-
gorization adds the dimension of return momentum, which fund managers tend to
employ (Carhart 1997). Finally, since fund managers extract information from their
industry experiences (Kempf et al. 2016), our third and fourth styles are based on
Fama and French’s 12 or 48 industries (Fama and French 1997).
After assigning each stock to a style group for each quarter, we take an average of
our previously computed experienced returns measure at the style level for each fund
and quarter, and then examine whether this style-specific experienced return relates
to the weight attached to the specific style in the following quarter. The dependent
16To do this classification, we use the NYSE breakpoints based on firm MV and firm B/M. Firms
in the bottom (top) 30th (70th) MV percentile are small (large) stocks. Firms in the bottom (top)
30th (70th) B/M percentile are growth (value) stocks. Firms in-between the 30th-70th MV (B/M )
percentiles are classed as mid-sized (blend) stocks.
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Table 3.6: Changes in Shares Held and Response to Flows
This table presents the results of the effects of experienced returns on investment decisions in the
presence of flows. The dependent variable is the percentage change in shares held by the manager
of fund i in stock j from quarters t − 1 to t, adjusted for stock splits (ChangeShares). The main
independent variable is an experience measure dummy, which equals 1 if the manager of fund i
is in the top 20%, 25%, or 33% in terms of experienced returns (Experience for firm j at t − 1
across all funds. In this table, the decay parameter φ is set to 0.25, which is the estimate obtained
in column (3) of Table 3.4. When a fund is team-managed, we take a tenure-weighted average of
Experience in firm j by each manager, where tenure is based on the date that each manager first
appeared in the Morningstar database. flow is capital inflows or outflows as a proportion of the
fund’s TNA. We follow the specification in Lou (2012), controlling for the proportion fund i owns in
firm j with respect to the total number of shares outstanding (owni,j,t−1), the Amihud’s illiquidity
ratio (illiqj,t−1), as well as the interaction of these two variables with flow. For definitions of the
variables, see Table A1 in Appendix. We estimate the model separately for outflows (flow < 0) and
inflows (flow > 0). All specifications include a fund style × time fixed effect and an unreported
intercept. Standard errors are clustered by firm × time. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
All continuous independent variables are divided by their sample standard deviations. ***, **, and
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level respectively.
Outflow Inflow
Top 33% Top 25% Top 20% Top 33% Top 25% Top 20%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ExperienceDummyi,j,t−1 x flowi,t -0.081*** -0.050*** -0.030** 0.065*** 0.051*** 0.042***
(-6.49) (-3.74) (-2.04) (9.19) (6.57) (4.92)
ExperienceDummyi,j,t−1 0.018*** 0.033*** 0.044*** 0.017*** 0.033*** 0.046***
(20.64) (33.23) (39.42) (20.99) (33.87) (40.59)
flowi,t 0.483*** 0.475*** 0.472*** 0.815*** 0.821*** 0.823***
(57.77) (59.89) (61.62) (193.00) (204.35) (210.93)
Characteristics
owni,j,t−1 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(11.23) (11.76) (12.20) (16.03) (16.60) (17.08)
owni,j,t−1 x flowi,t -0.095*** -0.095*** -0.095*** 0.011** 0.011*** 0.011***
(-15.11) (-15.15) (-15.19) (3.23) (3.20) (3.15)
illiqj,t−1 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-4.15) (-4.17) (-4.15) (-0.60) (-0.60) (-0.61)
illiqj,t−1 x flowi,t 0.010 0.010 0.010 -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023***
(1.58) (1.56) (1.50) (-4.57) (-4.58) (-4.56)
Fixed Effects Style x Time Style x Time Style x Time Style x Time Style x Time Style x Time
Parameter [fixed] 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
#Obs 3,315,788 3,315,788 3,315,788 3,199,253 3,199,253 3,199,253
Adj R2 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.051 0.051 0.051
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variable in the model is Weightadj , averaged for each fund and quarter at each style
level. We control for various fund-level characteristics, as in our baseline models
for Table 3.3 on page 50 and described in equation (3.3) on page 45. Moreover, we
include a style × time fixed effect, which controls for all information about a given
style that is common across all managers, as well as a fund fixed effect.
The results are in Table 3.7 on page 60. The coefficients on style-level experienced
returns are positive and significant, at approximately 0.02%. We re-do the test
using the tenure-weighted experienced returns measure from equation (3.4) on page
53 and report the results in Table A.4 in the Appendix. Again we find positive and
significant coefficients, which range from approximately 0.06% to 0.07%. In both
cases, the coefficients on experienced returns are larger, relative to our baseline
firm-level analysis from equation (3.3) on page 45, which suggests that experienced
returns matter more on the style level. One possible explanation for this result
is memory constraints. Perhaps it is easier to recall return experiences that are
associated with broader styles as opposed to individual stocks. This is precisely the
motivation behind style-level thinking, as outlined in Barberis and Shleifer (2003),
i.e., it simplifies information processing when making portfolio decisions.
3.4 Do Experienced Returns Reflect Managerial Skill?
Is the effect of experienced returns information-based? It is possible that experienced
returns on the fund level (i.e., averaged across stocks for a given fund) reveal the
skill of the manager in picking stocks. Therefore, managers with better overall
experienced returns are better stock pickers. Moreover, the fact that managers place
larger bets on firms with higher experienced returns, may indicate that experienced
returns on the stock level (i.e., averaged across funds for a given stock) constitute
a “buy” signal that positively predicts future stock returns. In this section we
investigate these important issues.
3.4.1 Fund Performance
To investigate whether experienced returns reveal the skill of the manager, we aver-
age experienced returns for fund i and quarter t across all stocks owned by this fund,
(AggExpRetFund), and examine whether this aggregate variable can predict future
fund returns. According to the skill-based hypothesis, and as long as investors do
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Table 3.7: Style-Level Experience
This table presents the results of the effect of experienced returns on investment decisions at the
style level, following the procedures explained in the note to Table 3.3. The dependent variable
is Weightadji,j,t, averaged equally for specific styles for fund i and quarter t. The key independent
variable is Experience, value-weighted averaged at the style level. We consider four different style
categorizations: a split of all stocks according to MV and B/M (3×3 sorts) (column (1)), a catego-
rization based on Daniel et al. (1997), where stocks are sorted in 5× 5× 5 portfolios based on MV,
B/M, and return momentum (column (2)), and industry categorizations using 12 or 48 industries,
using Fama/French definitions (columns (3)-(4)). All specifications include a style × time fixed
effect, a fund fixed effect, and an unreported intercept. For definitions of the variables see Table
A1 in Appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the style × time level. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. All continuous independent variables are divided by their sample standard deviations.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level respectively.
Morningstar DGTW F-F 12 Industries F-F 48 Industries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Experiencei,s,t−1 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.022***
(4.93) (23.14) (9.45) (16.53)
Fund Controls
fund alphai,t−1 -0.009** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(-1.99) (-7.80) (-3.89) (-6.10)
flowi,t−1 -0.018*** -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.015***
(-10.11) (-25.30) (-16.20) (-19.56)
ln(fund agei,t−1) 0.004 0.002 -0.008** -0.005**
(0.78) (1.19) (-2.57) (-2.38)
ln(TNAi,t−1) -0.113*** -0.075*** -0.079*** -0.074***
(-24.79) (-48.89) (-28.65) (-38.58)
turnoveri,t−1 -0.012*** -0.017*** -0.025*** -0.022***
(-4.91) (-20.97) (-17.37) (-21.97)
manager tenurei,t−1 -0.002 -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.008***
(-0.69) (-6.51) (-2.67) (-5.14)
teami,t−1 0.006 0.005*** 0.005 0.005**
(1.31) (2.92) (1.52) (2.25)
Fixed Effects Style x Time Style x Time Industry x Time Industry x Time
Fixed Effects Fund Fund Fund Fund
Parameter 0.46 0.41 0.37 0.35
#Obs 255,469 2,180,382 659,180 1,452,527
Adj R2 0.486 0.459 0.464 0.445
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not allocate capital across funds according to AggExpRetFund (i.e., Berk and Green
2004), the coefficient on this variable should be positive.
To measure fund performance, we estimate the Carhart four-factor model using two
years of past fund monthly returns (Carhart 1997). Then, we compute the expected
return for each fund from the factor model, and subtract it from the fund’s realized
return. We control for fund characteristics as in the regression for Table 3.3 on
page 50: flow, ln(fund age), ln(TNA), turnover, the number of stocks held in a
fund, manager tenure, team, and up to four lags of past fund returns. We also
include active share as an additional control variable, which is designed to capture
performance (Cremers and Petajisto 2009), as well as fund and fund style fixed
effects.
The results, shown in Table 3.8, indicate that the coefficient on AggExpRetFund is
negative and statistically significant. In column (1), the coefficient suggests that a
one standard deviation increase in AggExpRetFund is associated with an approx-
imate 0.18% reduction in quarterly abnormal returns, statistically significant at
the 1% level. When we add a fund fixed effect to the model, the coefficient on
AggExpRetFund is reduced to 9.5 basis points, and is statistically significant on
the 10% level. This result suggests that the behavior of managers with higher ag-
gregated experienced returns is distorted in some way that is detrimental to fund
performance.
One possible distortion is biased learning, as discussed in Gervais and Odean (2001).
According to this theory, better past outcomes cultivate overconfidence due to biased
self-attribution. This leads to more “aggressive” behavior from traders, and thus
a deterioration in the quality of their future decisions. To test this hypothesis, we
examine whether a higher AggExpRetFund is positively related to three variables
that capture the aggressiveness of trading behavior, namely turnover (Barber and
Odean 2000), active share, and tracking error. Active share, proposed by Cremers
and Petajisto (2009), reflects the sum of absolute deviations from the benchmark
index.17 A higher active share, therefore, indicates more aggressive trading in the
sense that the manager’s conviction in the quality of his private signals is high.
Tracking error is the standard deviation of the difference between the return of
the fund and the return of the benchmark index. A higher tracking error implies
that the manager’s portfolio differs from the benchmark portfolio, which is another
indicator of the manager’s conviction in the quality of his private signals.
17We obtain active share and tracking error data from Antti Petajisto’s website at
http : //www.petajisto.net/data.html. We thank him for making this data publicly available.
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The results are shown in Table 3.8 on page 63. We focus the discussion on the models
that include a fund fixed effect, which we test the hypothesis using within fund vari-
ation in AggExpRetFund. Consistent with the theory of Gervais and Odean (2001),
the coefficient on AggExpRetFund is positive and significant for all three measures
in columns (4), (6), and (8), suggesting that higher aggregated experienced returns
make managers trade more aggressively. An alternative explanation could also re-
lated to mean-reversion in returns. Indeed it is also possible that the documented
results stem from the negative long-term effect of fund performance as illustrated
by the persistent negative estimates of past fund returns at the third and fourth
lags.
A second distortion that may be associated with higher aggregate experienced re-
turns is suggested by Kempf et al. (2016), who show that managers who experience
an industry shock conduct more profitable trades in the future. They suggest that
this result arises because trading in adverse situations presents learning opportu-
nities for mutual fund managers. In our setting, higher values for AggExpRetFund
imply a relative absence of negative return experiences, and thus inferior learning
opportunities. To test this hypothesis, we calculate two different aggregate expe-
rienced returns measures, one for positive and one for negative experience stocks
(AggExpRet−Fund and AggExpRet
+
Fund , respectively), expecting that the effect of
the latter variable on fund returns is more significant. The results in column (10)
of Table 3.8 on page 63 show that the coefficient on AggExpRet+Fund is statisti-
cally insignificant, whereas the coefficient on AggExpRet−Fund is negative and highly
significant, with a one standard deviation increase in AggExpRet−Fund being asso-
ciated with a 0.25% reduction in next quarter’s fund returns. The results support
the findings of Kempf et al. (2016), suggesting that the absence of negative return
experiences are costly to future fund performance.
Overall the results suggest that higher experienced returns are not reflective of
managerial skill, and that they entail distortions that are detrimental to future fund
performance.
3.4.2 Stock Returns
To investigate whether experienced returns reveal fundamental information about
the stock, we average experienced returns for stock j and quarter t across all man-
agers (AggExpRetFirm), and examine whether this aggregated variable can predict
future earning shocks and returns.
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Earnings announcements
For our first test we examine whether AggExpRetFirm can predict the earnings
surprise in the next quarter, which we estimate using the seasonal random walk
model, or cumulative market-adjusted stock returns in the days surrounding the
earnings announcement. In these models we use the firm-level control variables
used in previous tests, namely the natural logarithm of MV and B/M , and four
lags of past quarterly stock returns. Moreover, when the dependent variable in the
model is the cumulative stock return in the earnings announcement period, we also
control for the earnings surprise, SUE. Under the information-based hypothesis we
expect that the coefficient on AggExpRetFirm is positive and significant in these
models.
The results are shown in Table 3.9 on page 66. In column (1) the dependent variable
is the earnings shock, and in columns ((2)-(4)) the return in different windows around
the earnings announcement. As seen from all columns of Table 3.9, the coefficient
on AggExpRetFirm is statistically insignificant, a finding which does not support
the information-based hypothesis.
A portfolio-based test
For our second test we examine whether AggExpRetFirm can predict stock returns
in a portfolio setting. Each quarter, we sort stocks into quintile portfolios according
to this variable, which we hold for the next quarter. We risk-adjust the returns
of these portfolios using two benchmark models, the Fama-French three- and five-
factor models (Fama and French 1993; Fama and French 2015), both augmented
with the momentum factor, resulting in four- and six-factor models, respectively.18
Moreover, since stock return predictability is typically stronger for smaller firms
(e.g., Zhang 2006), where limits to arbitrage are more binding, we first split the
sample into two groups based on firm size, cutting at the median NYSE market
value, and then form quintile portfolios separately in each group.
The results are shown in Table 3.10 on page 67. Panel A presents the results for
small stocks. Contrary to the information-based hypothesis, for the four-factor
model, we find that average returns decrease monotonically as we move through the
AggExpRetFirm quintiles, ranging from 1.37% for Q1 to -0.78% for Q5. The return
18Data on the factors are from Kenneth French’s data library at
http : //mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html. We thank him
for making the data publicly available.
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Table 3.9: Experience and Earnings Announcements
This table presents the results of the effects of experienced returns on returns around earnings
announcements. For this test, the decay parameter φ is set to 0.25, which is the estimate obtained
in column (3) of Table 3.4. When a fund is team-managed, we take a tenure-weighted average of
Experience in firm j by each manager, where tenure is based on the data that each manager appeared
in the Morningstar database. To conduct the test, we first take a value-held weighted average of
Experience for stock j across all funds in each quarter t, AggExpRetFirm. Our dependent variables
are earnings surprise (SUEj,t, calculated using the seasonal random walk model) and cumulative
market-adjusted returns (CARj,t) around earnings announcements in a window (t-1,t+1), (t-2,t+2),
or (t-1,t+3). Firms controls include lagged MV , B/M , and four lags of stock returns. When CAR
is the dependent variable, we also control for SUEj,t. For detailed descriptions of all variables,
see Table A1 in the Appendix. All specifications include an unreported intercept, and a time fixed
effect. Standard errors are clustered by firm. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively.
SUE CAR(-1;+1) CAR(-2;+2) CAR(-1;+3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AggExpRetFirmj,t−1 -1.768 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-0.91) (0.98) (0.57) (0.79)
SUEj,t 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000
(7.60) (3.06) (-1.63)
ln(MV j,t−1) -1.297 -0.000** -0.000 -0.001**
(-0.97) (-1.99) (-1.28) (-2.09)
ln(B/M j,t−1) 1.983 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.95) (7.35) (8.68) (6.95)
retj,t−1 9.164 -0.001** -0.002*** -0.001***
(1.00) (-2.11) (-4.43) (-2.92)
retj,t−2 -0.644 -0.001* -0.001*** -0.001***
(-1.29) (-1.77) (-3.89) (-3.23)
retj,t−3 1.288 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(1.31) (-2.86) (-4.10) (-3.12)
retj,t−4 -1.004 -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*
(-1.02) (-2.49) (-3.56) (-1.67)
Fixed Effects Time Time Time Time
# Obs. 191,439 191,438 191,439 191,438
Adj R2 0.000 0.004 0.007 0.006
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differential between the high and low AggExpRetFirm portfolios is equal to 2.15%
per quarter, and is highly statistically significant (t-stat= 4.42). The result is very
similar when using the six-factor model, where the return differential is 2.06% per
quarter (t-stat= 4.06).
Table 3.10: Experienced Returns and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns
This table presents the results of the effects of experienced returns on stock returns. For this
test, the decay parameter φ is set to 0.25, which is the estimate obtained in column (3) of Table
3.4. When a fund is team-managed, we take a tenure-weighted average of Experience in firm j by
each manager, where tenure is based on the data that each manager appeared in the Morningstar
database. To conduct the test, we first take a value-held weighted average of Experience for stock
j across all funds in each quarter, AggExpRetFirm. We then split firms into two groups based
on market value of equity (Small vs. Large), using the median NYSE market capitalization as
the cut-off to form the two groups. We then sort stocks into quintile portfolios, separately for
small and large stocks, based on AggExpRetFirm. We obtain the equally-weighted return on these
portfolios for the next quarter, as well as the hedge portfolio Q1-Q5. The excess returns on these
portfolios is then regressed on the Fama-French 3 or 5 factors, including the momentum factor
(MOM). Standard errors are computed using the Newey-West correction for 4 lags. t-statistics are
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
confidence levels, respectively.
Quintile
1 2 3 4 5 1-5
Panel A: Small firms
FF3+MOM α(%) 1.37*** 0.80** 0.43 0.15 -0.78** 2.15***
(2.64) (2.07) (1.42) (0.50) (-2.07) (4.42)
FF5+MOM α(%) 1.11*** 0.17 0.01 -0.30 -0.95** 2.06***
(2.63) (0.57) (0.05) (-1.10) (-2.27) (4.46)
Panel B: Large firms
FF3+MOM α(%) 1.13*** 0.70*** 0.30 -0.20 -1.53*** 2.66***
(3.58) (2.83) (1.17) (-0.74) (-4.08) (5.98)
FF5+MOM α(%) 0.71*** 0.18 -0.09 -0.40 -1.06*** 1.77***
(2.55) (0.94) (-0.45) (-1.13) (-2.61) (4.64)
In Panel B of Table 3.10, we present results for large stocks. Using the four-factor
model, we find that holding period returns decrease monotonically across the quin-
tiles, ranging from 1.13% for Q1 to -1.53% for Q5. The return differential between
the high and low AggExpRetFirm portfolios is equal to 2.66% per quarter, and is
highly statistically significant (t-stat= 5.98). The corresponding return differential
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when using the six-factor model is 1.77% per quarter (t-stat= 4.64).
These results do not support the view that fund-manager experienced returns re-
veal fundamental information about the stock. Rather, these results are in line
with literature showing that the trades of mutual fund managers can induce price
pressure, and cause misvaluations in the cross-section of stock returns (i.e., Coval
and Stafford 2007; Frazzini and Lamont 2008; Lou 2012; Akbas et al. 2015). In
our setting, it is possible that stocks with higher experienced returns, which are
preferred by mutual fund managers, become over-priced. Conversely, stocks with
lower experienced returns become under-priced. With the passage of time, as prices
converge to fundamental levels, the latter will outperform the former.19
Overall, the results in this section suggest that the effect of experienced returns
on the trades of mutual fund managers is not information-based. Moreover, and
perhaps more worryingly, experienced returns do not seem to be a mere side-show.
Rather, they seem to be associated with distortions on the fund level that are costly
to fund performance, and with mispricings in the cross section of stocks.
3.5 Summary
We examine whether mutual fund managers invest more heavily in stocks in which
they have experienced better returns in the past. The results support this hypothe-
sis. Moreover, managers are less willing to sell stocks with high experienced returns
when faced with outflows, and more willing to “top-up” these stocks when faced with
inflows. Experienced returns do not influence the trading decisions of the managers
of index funds, which further supports our hypothesis.
We also examine whether experienced returns reflect managerial skill. We find that
higher aggregated experienced returns are associated with lower future fund re-
turns. Moreover, we find that higher aggregated experienced returns are associated
with higher turnover, active share, and tracking error. These findings suggest that
managers with higher experienced returns become more overconfident, trade more
aggressively, and earn lower returns. Finally, we find that stocks with higher ex-
perienced returns, which are overweighted in mutual fund portfolios, subsequently
underperform stocks with lower experienced returns.
19A different possibility is that experienced returns in this setting capture long-run reversals,
documented by De Bondt and Thaler (1985). However, this is less likely since we risk-adjust
returns using multi-factor models, which can price the long-run reversal effect (Fama and French
1996).
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Whereas the canonical asset pricing model assumes that the perception of risk for
individual companies is “objective,” recent work suggests that risk perception is sub-
jective, as it is influenced by investors’ personal experiences with these companies.
Our work highlights that this effect is pervasive, influencing the portfolio decisions
of sophisticated investors as well. These findings suggest that, to better understand
outcomes in financial markets, it is fruitful to further study how subjective factors
influence the behavior of different market participants.
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Chapter 4
Economic Uncertainty in
Mutual Fund Communication
4.1 Introduction
When a seller provides information about a commodity, it can serve as a tool for
a potential buyer to assess its quality (Stigler 1987). Consequently, information
quality can affect the buyer’s propensity to purchase the commodity, and ultimately
consumer welfare. Information precision has been studied in a number of context
such as political campaign (e.g., Coate 2004, Prat 2006) or marketing (Johnson
and Myatt 2006). However, surprisingly few studies explore the role of information
provision in the context of U.S. mutual funds, despite their economic importance.
As of 2018, the size of this industry represented approximately $18 trillion according
to the Investment Company Institute. This chapter contributes to a large literature
on information economics by providing evidence of the role of communication in the
mutual fund industry.
In this chapter, I explore how mutual funds’ use of terms in their communication
channels related to economic policy uncertainty can affect their investors’ assertion
of their products. Mutual funds are required by the SEC to report to their investors
on a semiannual and annual basis about their performance, risk, and expenses in a
shareholders’ report. They are free to discuss extensively about the general state of
the economy in different sections of the report. This gives them room for strategic
communication. I hypothesize that increasing discussion about economic uncer-
tainty will decrease the signal precision of fund quality, i.e., performance.
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Using a dictionary-based text analysis, I count the number of occurrences of words
related to economic policy uncertainty following the list of words of Baker et al.
(2016) in U.S. fund companies shareholders reports from 2003 to 2018. I find that
an increase of economic policy uncertainty language leads to higher fund flows. In
economic terms, a one standard deviation increase in economic uncertain words leads
to a 4% increase in flows, or approximately $30M considering the average fund size.
Fund flows are important for financial markets. Greenwood and Thesmar (2011)
show that fund flows can make asset prices fragile and predict volatility. As fund
flows affect stock prices, it is important to better understand its drivers.
To understand the relationship between uncertain language and fund flows, Johnson
and Myatt (2006)’s framework provides insights regarding the optimality of signal
precision. When a firm targets a mass market, it is optimal to provide imprecise
signals about their product. In the context of mutual funds, it is difficult for an
investor to be appealed by specific characteristics of a fund product as most of the
funds offer similar services. Thus, the U.S. active equity fund industry will resemble
a mass market where product will have a plain-vanilla design.1 In the context of a
mass market strategy, it is optimal to provide noisy signals as this will increase the
funds’ revenues (Johnson and Myatt 2006).
The fact that economic uncertainty language leads to higher flows helps understand
why the average fund with zero excess returns would still receive inflows. However,
this does not shed light on the fact that poor performing funds receive lower outflows
than predicted by workhorse models (e.g., Berk and Green 2004). To investigate
this puzzle, I test the effect of economic uncertainty language on flows conditional on
bad performance and find that the positive effect on flows is stronger for bad funds.
Mullainathan et al. (2008) model offers general insights to understand this result.
They document that during market downturns, mutual funds advertize less their
own performance. Thus, a poorly performing fund would be better off increasing
economic uncertain language when its own performance is bad.
In the next test, I explore the channels through which language affects fund flows.
To disentangle economic uncertainty language from sentiment measures, I control for
the tone of the document using dictionaries from Loughran and McDonald (2011).
I find that a negative tone will negatively affect flows, consistent with findings from
Hillert et al. (2014), but cannot explain the economic uncertainty results nor the
1Johnson and Myatt (2006) explain that a precise signal would be optimal in a niche market.
This could for example correspond to financial institutions catering to investors through product
design as in Ce´le´rier and Valle´e (2017).
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size of the document.
One explanation for language to influence investors decision is limited attention. It
is possible that investors will face more difficulties processing information in a large
document that contains more words related to economic uncertainty as in limited
information processing models (e.g., Sims 2003). To test this possibility, I explore
the role of economic policy uncertainty language on flows separately for retail funds
and institutional funds. Retail funds are investment vehicles targeted specifically to
retail investors according to Morningstar. Prior research shows that retail investors
are more subject to behavioral biases such as overconfidence (Odean 1999). I find
that the documented effect of economic uncertainty is stronger for retail funds.
Companies might communicate strategically to obfuscate financially relevant in-
formation (Persson 2018). Barber et al. (2005) show that front-end load fees are
relevant for investors and more salient than other expenses. As a result, investors
tend to avoid funds with high front-end load fees. If mutual funds communicate
more about economic policy uncertainty, this might make front-end load fees less
salient. I find results that corroborate this hypothesis.
This chapter’s contribution is threefold. First, it contributes to the large literature
on mutual fund performance and the active fund puzzle. Gruber (1996) explains that
the growth of the active fund management industry represents a puzzle given the
lack of evidence of performance. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano
(1998) show that flows to funds are strongly related to past performance. Later, Berk
and Green (2004) provide a model to explain this flow-performance relationship.
However, it is still difficult to explain why an average fund with zero excess returns
would receive positive flows. This study provides an alternative explanation to this
puzzle building on the effects of mutual fund communication on investors’ behavior.
Second, this chapter contributes to a large and growing literature on text analysis
in finance. Many studies have looked at the effect of news media (Tetlock 2007),
language in firms’ 10-Ks (e.g., Loughran and McDonald 2011; Jegadeesh and Wu
2013; Loughran and McDonald 2014) on asset prices. While many researchers have
focused on firms reports, surprisingly few have looked at the institutional investors
reporting language. In a related study, Hillert et al. (2014) look at sentiment mea-
sures in fund communication and find that positive tones positively affect fund flows.
This chapter contributes to the literature on text analysis in finance and focuses on
economic uncertainty in communication rather than sentiment measures.
Third, this study contributes to an extensive literature on information economics
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and communication. Many researchers have studied asymmetric information be-
tween economic agents its consequences on strategic communication (e.g., Grossman
1981; Milgrom 1981; and Crawford and Sobel 1982). Thus communication between
two parties can be a useful tool for an information receiver (Stigler 1961), but also a
strategic one for the sender (Lippmann 1922). Bertrand et al. (2010) show that con-
sumers can be persuaded to take up loans in the context of direct-mail solicitations
in South Africa. In politics, DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) show that having access
to Fox News made voters more likely to choose the Republican party in 2000. In
financial markets, Engelberg and Parsons (2011) show that local trading responds
to local coverage of earnings announcements. This chapter shows how investors are
influenced by the way mutual fund communicate with consequences on fund flows
and industry size.
4.2 Institutional Background
Registered management investment companies have to complete and file with the
Securities and Exchange Commission the N-CSR Form according to the Investment
Company Act of 1940. Management investment companies are firms that sell fund
shares to the public. Fund companies file the N-CSR, also called shareholders’
report, on a semiannual (Form N-CSRS) and annual basis (Form N-CSR).
The N-CSR Form typically includes a shareholders’ letter, usually signed by the
CEO of the investment company. It also includes a performance summary, economic
and market overview, investment, manager’s discussion, details about the expenses,
portfolio composition as well as other information regarding the financial statements.
Thus, the N-CSR is akin to a firm’s 10-Ks and is the most comprehensive SEC Form
for mutual funds.
Details and examples related to fees are mandatory in shareholders’ report. Other
sections related to performance, portfolio composition, discussion of fund perfor-
mance are also mandatory. However, there are no requirements regarding the length
of these discussions. Thus, even in the presence of disclosure mandate, information
overload can arise, potentially at the expense of consumers (Persson 2018).
Mutual funds communicate via others channels. Typically, they are also required
to file summary prospectuses (Form 497) which was proposed in late 2007. The
goal was to simplify disclosure of fund information to investors. It includes infor-
mation regarding the investment objective, fees and expenses, historical turnover,
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returns, and risks, among other items. However, as its name indicates, the sum-
mary prospectus is much shorter and thus gives less room for the fund company to
communicate strategically. Moreover, Beshears et al. (2009) find that simplified dis-
closure does not affect investors’ choices of funds. Mutual funds also communicate
using advertising channels such as in news media outlets (Mullainathan et al. 2008).
This chapter does not cover fund communication in these alternative channels.
4.3 Data and Methodology
In this section I describe the various data sources and variables used in the empirical
test performed.
4.3.1 Mutual Fund Characteristics
I obtain mutual fund characteristics from the CRSP Mutual Fund Database. Namely,
I collect information on fund size (total net assets; TNA), returns, age, turnover ra-
tio, and expense ratio.
I focus on U.S. active domestic equity universe by using the CRSP investment
objective code.2 Following Lou (2012), I impose funds to have a minimum size of
$1 million.
I compute annual flows as the percentage change of fund size on top of fund returns.
More specifically, flows is computed as follows:
flowsi,t =
TNAi,t − TNAi,t−1 ∗ (1 +Ri,t)
TNAi,t−1
, (4.1)
where TNAi,t−1 and TNAi,t are fund i’s total net assets at the end of year t − 1
and t, respectively, while Ri,t is fund i’s return over the year t.
To measure fund performance, I follow prior studies (e.g., Kacperczyk et al. 2005;
Ben-David et al. 2018) and define it as the difference between a fund’s realized
return and its return predicted by a factor model. I use the Carhart (1997) four-
factor model using monthly data. With a rolling window of 60 months as in Ben-
David et al. (2018), I estimate factor loadings and use the estimates without the
intercept the obtain the predicted return. More specifically, I estimate the following
2I restrict the CRSP investment objective code to start with “ED”, where the “E” stands for
equity and the “D” stands for domestic.
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four-factor model for fund i at month t:
Ri,τ −Rfτ = ai,t + βi,t(MKTτ −Rfτ ) + si,τSMBτ +hi,τHMLτ +ui,τUMDτ + i,τ ,
(4.2)
where τ = t− 60, ..., t− 1, Ri,τ is the fund i’s net return in month τ , Rf is the one
month Treasury bill, MKT (market), SMB (size), HML (value), and UMD (mo-
mentum) are the four factors as in Carhart (1997). Then, I define fund performance
α as follows:
αi,t = Ri,t −Rft − [βˆi,t(MKTt −Rft) + sˆi,tSMBt + hˆi,tHMLt + uˆi,tUMDt], (4.3)
where the coefficient denote by a hat are estimated from equation (4.2). Monthly
performance is aggregated at the year level by cumulating monthly α to obtain
annual fund performance.
To proxy for a fund’s propensity to take risk, such as deviating from a benchmark, I
use the factor loading on the market factor from the CAPM (β from equation (4.2)
but based on the CAPM, that is, without the factors SMB, HML, and UMD).
This measure is a useful proxy of systemic risk for active managers as it represents
the extent to which a fund’s returns respond to those of the market (in this case all
firms from the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ).
4.3.2 Mutual Fund Communication
I collect mutual fund communication from the SEC Edgar database. I obtain fund
companies’ CIK (central identifier key; which is the identifier for the SEC Edgar
database) from the CRSP Mutual Fund database and use it to scrape mutual fund
shareholders’ reports. Mutual funds communicate about their performance through
various forms which include summary prospectuses (form 497), shareholders’ re-
ports (form N-CSR), but also voluntary disclosure such as advertising in the media.
The advantage of using shareholders’ reports is that they are more comprehensive
than summary prospectuses and more readily available than advertising campaigns.
Moreover, mutual funds sometimes strategically do not communicate about their
performance in advertising as shown by Mullainathan et al. (2008). In shareholders
reports they are required to do so but are free to communicate as much as they
want about other topics such as the economic environment.
The documents are cleaned following Gentzkow et al. (2017). I first remove all
elements of the text other than words (e.g., html tags, numbers, punctuations).
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Then, I remove stop words using Porter (1980).3
4.3.3 Measuring Economic Uncertainty
To measure economic uncertainty in mutual fund shareholders’ reports, I use a
dictionary-based method following Baker et al. (2016). The authors measure the
frequency of articles in top U.S. newspapers that contain the words “economic”
or “economy”; “uncertain” or “uncertainty”; and “congress”, “deficit”, “Federal
Reserve”, “legislation”, “regulation” or “White House”. With this list of words, the
authors created an index that captures economic policy uncertainty and correlates
with other uncertainty measures, such as stock market volatility and spiked at major
events such as 9/11 attacks and Presidential elections.
Using this method in the context of mutual fund communication is relevant for
several reasons. As the measure proposed by Baker et al. (2016) correlates with
stock market volatility, it allows the fund companies to emphasize the degree of
uncertainty by using more words taken from the list proposed by the authors. As it
echoes the words used by journalists in top U.S. newspapers, it amplifies the degree
of uncertainty of investors who potentially read both shareholders’ report and U.S.
newspapers. For these reasons, I measure economic uncertainty (EU) as follows:
EUi,t−1 = ci,t−1, (4.4)
where ci,t−1 is the raw count of words in the list: “economic”, “economy”, “uncer-
tain”, “uncertainty”, “congress”, “deficit”, “Federal Reserve”, “legislation”, “regu-
lation” and “White House” in all reports published by the investment company of
fund i in year t− 1. Appendix B shows an example of content from a N-CSR form
with the counted words highlighted.
Table 4.1 on page 77 summarizes the variables used in this study. The N-CSR
coverage before 2003 is sparse. Thus, the sample starts from 2003 to 2018 and
contains 7,228 distinct funds and an average of 4,076 funds per year and 731 fund
companies. The average count of uncertain words is more than 7,198 per companies
in a year. The average fund has flow of 1%, is 14 years old, and an annual turnover
of 70%.
3Stopwords include words such as “the”, “a”, or “and”.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics of our main variables. The sample is composed of U.S.
actively managed mutual funds from 2003 to 2018. Fund documents are obtained from the S.E.C.
and other fund characteristics are obtained from the CRSP Mutual Fund Database. Age is expressed
in years. Total net assets (TNA) are measured in millions. Expense and turnover ratio are in
percentage. Fund documents are at the year-fund company level, while other variables are at the
year-fund level.
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max P25 P50 P75
Fund by year 35,303 4075.7 1553.75 888 6115 2772 4283 5395
Company by year 35,303 542.91 88.29 296 632 476 575 623
Fund by company 35,303 32.76 36.25 1 164 8 19 44
EU 28,075 7197.9 15,873.15 37 98572 569 1765 5415
flows 35,295 0.01 0.47 -0.94 2.73 -0.18 -0.07 0.07
age 35,303 14.22 9.72 1 94 8 12 17
TNA 35,295 725.22 1949.88 1.3 14101.2 28.1 118.2 492.6
turnover 27,715 0.7 0.54 0.13 1.84 0.27 0.53 0.98
expense 27,850 0.05 0.18 0 1.12 0.01 0.01 0.02
fund return 28,075 0.11 0.2 -0.44 0.49 0.02 0.12 0.25
4.4 Results
In this section I present the results of the various tests performed to explore the
hypothesis that economic uncertainty affects investors’ behavior.
4.4.1 Attributes of Funds with High Economic Uncertainty Lan-
guage
Before investigating the effects of language on fund flows, I explore the determinants
of funds with high economic uncertainty language. For this purpose, I regress the
economic uncertainty language measure, EU, on fund characteristics:
EUi,t = β0 + β1Xi,t−1 + F + T + i,1. (4.5)
Xi,t−1 is a matrix that contains the following fund characteristics: annual fund
flows, the natural logarithm of fund age, the natural logarithm of fund size (TNA),
annual fund returns, annual turnover ratio, expense ratio, fund performance mea-
sured with the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and fund risk as measured by the
beta coefficient from the CAPM model. To account for potential correlation in the
residuals at the fund and time level, I include fund and time (year) fixed effects and
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double-cluster standard errors by fund and time.
Table 4.2 on page 79 shows the results. The first observation is that most variation
in economic uncertainty comes from unobservables, i.e., fund fixed effects. Indeed,
the adjusted R2 goes from 3% to approximately 88% when adding fixed effects. The
second observation is that funds with high economic uncertainty language tend to
be risky, poorly performing, and expensive funds. As hypothesized in the previous
sections, a fund that will be inclined to provide an unprecise signal will do so to
obfuscate information that could hurt in terms of fund flows. Thus, an expensive
funds will provide more details to the report in order to potentially distract the
reader from the fee section and similarly for bad performance and risk. Finally, the
results show that young funds tend to have higher economic uncertainty language.
A possible explanation for this finding is the career concerns of fund managers
(Chevalier and Ellison 1999). Fund age is correlated with manager tenure as shown
in chapter 3 (Table 3.2 on page 48). Younger managers tend to take on more
risk as documented by Greenwood and Nagel (2009) and thus potentially attempt
to hide risk with economic uncertainty language. Other fund characteristics (size,
returns, and turnover) do not seem to be statistically related to economic uncertainty
language.
4.4.2 Fund Flows and Economic Uncertainty Language
To investigate the role of economic uncertainty language in mutual fund communica-
tion on fund flows, I use a regression approach. I test if higher economic uncertainty
in reports published in year t− 1 leads to higher flows in year t as hypothesized in
the previous sections. More specifically, I use the following regression specification
as the main test:
flowsi,t = β0 + β1EUi,t−1 + β2Xi,t−1 + F + T + i,1. (4.6)
The dependent variable is the percentage change in fund size from the end of year
t − 1 to the end of year t on top of fund returns (see equation (4.1) on page 74).
The main independent variable (EU) is the count of words related to economic
uncertainty according to Baker et al. (2016) in all shareholders’ reports published in
year t− 1 by the company of fund i. To disentangle from other fund characteristics
that might affect fund flows, I control for various variables denoted by matrix Xi,t−1.
The set of controls include annual fund flows, the natural logarithm of fund age,
the natural logarithm of fund size (TNA), annual fund returns, annual turnover
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Table 4.2: The Determinants of Economic Uncertainty
This table presents estimates from panel regressions of mutual funds’ % Economic uncertainty on
fund characteristics. All regressions include year fixed effects. The regressions include as lagged
fund-level characteristics: alpha based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, beta based on
the CAPM model, expense ratio, quarterly fund flow, the natural logarithm of fund age , annual
fund return, the natural logarithm of fund size (TNA), expense ratio, and turnover ratio. Where
specificed, a fund and fund company fixed effect are included. Standard errors are double-clustered
by fund-year. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
EU i,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
flow i,t−1 268.047*** 277.996*** 300.474*** -20.345
(2.98) (3.02) (3.19) (-0.46)
ln(fund agei,t−1) -1.1e+03*** -1.1e+03*** -1.1e+03*** -1.0e+03***
(-12.98) (-13.27) (-13.32) (-6.34)
ln(TNAi,t−1) 881.782*** 895.365*** 923.540*** 225.328*
(8.48) (8.37) (8.55) (1.85)
fund returni,t−1 83.621 -99.889 -289.831 30.805
(0.65) (-0.65) (-1.44) (0.35)
turnover i,t−1 -38.766 -73.534 90.903
(-0.49) (-0.90) (1.40)
expensei,t−1 -678.177*** -665.392*** 1.1e+04**
(-12.28) (-11.95) (2.35)
alphai,t−1 32.320 -72.426*
(0.36) (-1.86)
betai,t−1 283.634*** -290.987***
(3.58) (-5.06)
Yes FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE No No No Yes
# Obs 28063 27486 27201 26572
Adj R2 0.026 0.030 0.030 0.876
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ratio, expense ratio, fund performance measured with the Carhart (1997) four-factor
model, the squared of fund performance to account for the convexity of the flow-
performance relationship (Chevalier and Ellison 1997), and fund risk as measured by
the beta coefficient from the CAPM model. All independent variables are measured
at t − 1. Finally, I include fund and year fixed effects and double-cluster standard
errors by fund and time to mitigate issues related to correlation of residuals across
funds and time.
Table 4.3 on page 81 shows the main results. The coefficient on economic uncertainty
EU is positive and statistically significant (0.041; t-stat= 4.60) for the specification
that includes all controls and fixed effects. This confirms the hypothesis that a higher
use of words related to economic uncertainty in shareholders’ reports leads to higher
flows. To give an economic interpretation of the results, a one standard deviation
increase in EU leads to an increase of flows of 4%, which represents approximately
$30M for the average fund. Other controls are consistent with prior literature. Fund
flows are persistent, that is lagged flows positively predicts future flows. Moreover,
investors are highly responsive to performance. They punish poorly performing
funds with outflows and reward good performing funds with inflows.4 Old and
large funds receive less flows which is consistent with the decreasing returns to scale
explanation (Berk and Green 2004).
In a recent study, Ben-David et al. (2018) show that investors are highly responsive
to fund rankings (Morningstar ratings). In the Appendix, I show that economic
uncertainty is robust to Morningstar ratings in explaining fund flows (see Table
B.1 on page 104). Moreover, measuring economic uncertainty relative to style-peers
gives similar results (see Table B.2 on page 105 in the Appendix).5 Finally, in
unreported results I find that the main results reported in Table 4.3 on page 81 are
robust to additional controls related to the investment company (i.e., family flow,
and family fixed effects).
Further Results on Language Channels
Following the confirmed hypothesis that economic uncertainty language correlates
with higher fund fund flows, I examine the channel through which uncertainty lan-
4Estimating fund performance with a shorter rolling window, i.e., 2 years as in chapter 2, does
not affect the results presented in this chapter.
5The motivation for this test is that if a given large-value fund communicates more about
economic uncertainty it is possibly because large value companies perform badly. Thus, it is relevant
to adjust EU with the style average.
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Table 4.3: Document Economic Uncertainty and Fund Flows
This table presents estimates from panel regressions of mutual funds’ % flows on their document’s
uncertainty. EU (Economic Uncertainty) is measured following Baker et al. (2016). All regressions
include fund and year fixed effects. I control for lagged fund-level characteristics, namely alpha
and squared alpha based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, beta based on the CAPM,
expense ratio, yearly fund flow, the natural logarithm of fund age , annual fund returns, the
natural logarithm of fund size (TNA), expense ratio, and turnover ratio. Standard errors are
double-clustered by fund-year. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Flowsi,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EU i,t−1 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.041***
(6.76) (4.48) (4.45) (4.60)
ln(fund agei,t−1) -0.019 -0.029** -0.035**
(-1.33) (-1.99) (-2.38)
ln(TNAi,t−1) -0.295*** -0.293*** -0.296***
(-19.03) (-18.60) (-18.55)
flow i,t−1 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.029***
(5.59) (5.55) (5.20)
fund returni,t−1 0.067*** 0.075*** 0.018
(8.77) (9.37) (1.47)
turnover i,t−1 -0.003 -0.004
(-0.48) (-0.57)
expensei,t−1 -0.047 -0.134
(-0.22) (-0.46)
alphai,t−1 0.040***
(7.93)
alpha2i,t−1 -0.001
(-0.31)
betai,t−1 0.012
(1.44)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Obs 32797 27464 26863 26572
Adj R2 0.276 0.334 0.339 0.343
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guage leads to higher fund flows. Higher economic uncertainty language could be
driven by longer shareholder reports or negative tone for instance. To distinguish
the effect of economic uncertainty from these alternative explanations, I estimate
the regression described in equation (4.6) on page 78 and control for additional
characteristics related to fund language. To control for the sentiment of the docu-
ment, I control for positive and negative tone of the shareholders’ reports following
Loughran and McDonald (2011).6 I also control for other measures that could relate
to the difficulty of information processing for readers, namely document length or
file size and average word length. Loughran and McDonald (2014) show that file size
is simple measure of document readability. Word length is also a proxy for complex
words.
Table 4.4 on page 83 presents the results on language channels. When controlling
for all additional document measures, namely negative document tone (Tone−i,t−1),
positive document tone (Tone+i,t−1), document length (DocLengthi,t−1), and average
word length (WordLengthi,t−1). The main independent variable of economic uncer-
tainty EU is robust to other document measures. The coefficient decreases from 4%
to 3.2% and remains statistically significant with a t-statistic of 3.52. A negative
(positive) document tone negatively (positively) affects fund flows, which is con-
sistent with findings by Hillert et al. (2014). Finally, other measures of readability
positively affect fund flows. This confirms the hypothesis that document uncertainty
benefits fund flows and does not capture other document-related measures.
4.4.3 Fund Flows, Bad Performance, and Economic Uncertainty
Language
Thus far, Table 4.3 on page 81 gives an explanation as to why the average fund
receives flows higher than predicted by standard models of delegated asset manage-
ment (e.g., Berk and Green 2004). However, it does not explain the convexity of the
flow-performance relationship, that is bad funds experience less outflows than they
should. To explore if fund communication can explain this convexity, I use the same
approach as the main model presented in equation (4.6) on page 78 conditional on
bad performance. More precisely, I estimate the following regression:
flowsi,t = β0 + β1PerfDummyi,t−1 ∗ EUi,t−1 + β2Xi,t−1 + F + T + i,1. (4.7)
6The authors created a list of words related to positive and negative sentiment specific to financial
applications.
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Table 4.4: Further Results on Language Channels
This table presents estimates from panel regressions of mutual funds’ % flows on their document’s
uncertainty. EU (Economic Uncertainty) is measured following Baker et al. (2016). All regressions
include fund and year fixed effects. Various additional controls are included related to fund docu-
ments: positive and negative tone of the documents, document and word length following Loughran
and Mcdonald (2011). I control for lagged fund-level characteristics, namely alpha and squared al-
pha based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, beta based on the CAPM, expense ratio, yearly
fund flow, the natural logarithm of fund age , annual fund returns, the natural logarithm of fund
size (TNA), expense ratio, and turnover ratio. Standard errors are double-clustered by fund-year.
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.
Flowsi,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EU i,t−1 0.040*** 0.033*** 0.040*** 0.037*** 0.032***
(4.53) (3.75) (4.59) (4.26) (3.53)
Tone−i,t−1 0.010 -0.140***
(0.78) (-4.52)
Tone+i,t−1 0.046*** 0.089***
(3.63) (3.48)
DocLengthi,t−1 0.023*** 0.024***
(4.09) (3.90)
WordLengthi,t−1 0.033** 0.069*
(2.30) (1.73)
Fund Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Obs 26572 26572 26572 26572 26572
Adj R2 0.343 0.344 0.344 0.343 0.344
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I define PerfDummyi,t−1 as an indicator variable that takes the value 1 whenever
fund i is in the bottom decile of the performance distribution as of the end of year
t−1. The set of controls in Xi,t−1 is the same as in the main regression specification
of equation (4.6) on page 78, namely annual fund flows, the natural logarithm of fund
age, the natural logarithm of fund size (TNA), annual fund returns, annual turnover
ratio, expense ratio, fund performance measured with the Carhart (1997) four-factor
model, the squared of fund performance to account for the convexity of the flow-
performance relationship (Chevalier and Ellison 1997), and fund risk as measured
by the beta coefficient from the CAPM model. Moreover, I also include in the set
of controls Xi,t−1 the two terms of the interaction separately (PerfDummyi,t−1
and EUi,t−1). As in the main analysis, I include firm and year fixed effects and
double-cluster standard errors by fund and year.
Table 4.5 on page 85 presents the results. The interaction term shows a positive and
statistically significant coefficient (0.022; t-stat= 2.25). This shows that the effect
of economic uncertainty language is stronger for funds with bad performance. In
economic terms, a fund with bad performance relative to its peers will have higher
flows by approximately $45M if it increases its economic uncertainty language by
one standard deviation. Typically, instead of being punished for bad performance
by $100M of outflows, a fund will experience only $55M of outflows if its company
focuses the discussion on economic uncertainty language in its shareholders’ reports.
Other controls have similar effects on flows as documented earlier. That is, lagged
flows and performance positively affects flows while age and size have a negative
effect.
4.4.4 Fund Flows, Business Cycles, and Economic Uncertainty Lan-
guage
Figure 4.1 on page 86 shows that mutual funds’ asset under management decreased
substantially during the 2008 financial crisis. At the same time, the length of share-
holders’ reports peaked at a record high (see Figure 4.2 on page 87). As Baker et al.
(2016) show, economic uncertainty was also at its highest around that period. Thus,
it is worth investigating how investors responded to economic uncertainty language
in periods of recessions as opposed to expansion periods.
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Table 4.5: Document Economic Uncertainty, Performance, and Fund Flows
This table presents estimates from panel regressions of mutual funds’ % flows on their document’s
uncertainty interacted with a performance dummy. EU (Economic Uncertainty) is measured fol-
lowing Baker et al. (2016). PerfDummy is a dummy for each fund that has an annual performance
(alpha) in the bottom decile of the performance distribution. All regressions include fund and year
fixed effects. I control for lagged fund-level characteristics, namely alpha and squared alpha based
on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, beta based on the CAPM, expense ratio, yearly fund flow,
the natural logarithm of fund age , annual fund returns, the natural logarithm of fund size (TNA),
expense ratio, and turnover ratio. Standard errors are double-clustered by fund-year. t-statistics
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Flowsi,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PerfDummy i,t−1*EU i,t−1 0.016 0.025** 0.026*** 0.022**
(1.60) (2.50) (2.61) (2.25)
EU i,t−1 0.040*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038***
(6.62) (4.23) (4.19) (4.26)
PerfDummy i,t−1 -0.078*** -0.052*** -0.049*** 0.003
(-8.39) (-5.09) (-4.69) (0.21)
ln(fund agei,t−1) -0.018 -0.027* -0.035**
(-1.23) (-1.90) (-2.39)
ln(TNAi,t−1) -0.296*** -0.294*** -0.296***
(-19.06) (-18.64) (-18.57)
flow i,t−1 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.029***
(5.50) (5.50) (5.20)
fund returni,t−1 0.056*** 0.062*** 0.018
(6.53) (6.83) (1.48)
turnover i,t−1 -0.002 -0.004
(-0.36) (-0.57)
expensei,t−1 -0.045 -0.140
(-0.21) (-0.48)
alphai,t−1 0.042***
(7.30)
alpha2i,t−1 -0.003
(-0.63)
betai,t−1 0.012
(1.47)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Obs 32797 27464 26863 26572
Adj R2 0.277 0.335 0.340 0.343
85
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Years
14
14.2
14.4
14.6
14.8
15
15.2
15.4
15.6
15.8
ln
($A
UM
 M
)
Figure 4.1: Mutual funds’ assets under management.
This figure shows the evolution of the natural logarithm of U.S. active equity mutual funds total
assets under management in million U.S. dollars.
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Figure 4.2: Mutual funds’ documents size.
This figure shows the evolution of the average U.S. active equity mutual funds N-CSR forms length
in number of characters. The grey area represents the recession period.
To investigate this question, I estimate the following regression specification
flowsi,t = β0 + β1recessiont−1 ∗ EUi,t−1 + β2Xi,t−1 + F + T + i,1. (4.8)
recessiont−1 is a dummy indicating if a recession occurred in year t−1. It is obtained
from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. EUi,t−1 as defined earlier is a the count
of words related to economic uncertainty in fund i’s company shareholders’ reports
filed in year t−1. Xi,t−1 denotes the set of lagged controls which include the recession
dummy, EUi,t−1, annual fund flows, the natural logarithm of fund age, the natural
logarithm of fund size (TNA), annual fund returns, annual turnover ratio, expense
ratio, fund performance measured with the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, the
squared of fund performance to account for the convexity of the flow-performance
relationship (Chevalier and Ellison 1997), and fund risk as measured by the beta
coefficient from the CAPM model. As in the previous sections, I include fund and
year fixed effects as well as standard errors double-clustered at the fund and year
level.
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Table 4.6 on page 89 shows the results of fund flows, business cycles, and economic
uncertainty language. The results indicate that economic uncertainty language is
more effective in expansion periods. While it is important to keep in mind the lack
of power of this test, due to the single period of recession in the present sample
shown in grey in Figure 4.2 on page 87, the coefficient on EUi,t−1 in column (5) of
Table 4.6 on page 89 is negative and statistically insignificant. This indicates that
an emphasis on economic uncertainty in recession periods in shareholders’ reports
does not prevent negative fund flows. In recession periods, the coefficient on lagged
flows becomes negative. One possibility is that since flows is lagged, the effect on
future flows is reversed as we move from one state of the economy to the other and
thus money flows in funds moving from a recession to an expansion period and vice
versa. Other controls show similar coefficients in recession and expansion periods
with the exception of beta which becomes positive and statistically significant. This
suggests risky funds suffer more in recession periods. Interestingly, emphasizing on
economic uncertainty in expansion periods helps prevent outflows as reported in the
previous sections.
4.4.5 Fund Flows, Clienteles, and Economic Uncertainty Language
A potential explanation for investors being influenced by the language of sharehold-
ers’ report is limited attention. Persson (2018) shows that information overload is
optimal for a firm subject to disclosure mandates in order to hide financially relevant
information. Motivated by this mechanism, I investigate if the effect of economic
uncertainty in mutual fund communication is stronger for investors with limited
attention.
For this test, I focus on funds targeted to retail investors. Odean (1999) shows
that retail investors are more subject to behavioral biases. I identify funds targeted
to retail investors using the Morningstar indicator variable. I merge Morningstar
information with the rest of the sample using fund CUSIP and Tickers following
Pa´stor et al. (2015). I estimate the model described in equation (4.6) on page
78 separately for the sample of funds targeted to retail investors and institutional
investors.7 When fund controls are included, I control for annual fund flows, the
natural logarithm of fund age, the natural logarithm of fund size (TNA), annual
fund returns, annual turnover ratio, expense ratio, fund performance measured with
7Mutual funds targeted to institutional investors are funds sold to other financial companies.
I assume that these investors devote more resources to the fund products they buy and are less
inattentive.
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Table 4.6: Document Economic Uncertainty, Recessions, and Fund Flows
This table presents estimates from panel regressions of mutual funds’ % flows on their document’s
uncertainty interacted with a recession dummy. EU (Economic Uncertainty) is measured following
Baker et al. (2016). Recession is a dummy for each end-of-year where the U.S. economy was in
a recession. All regressions include fund and year fixed effects. I control for lagged fund-level
characteristics, namely alpha and squared alpha based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model,
beta based on the CAPM, expense ratio, yearly fund flow, the natural logarithm of fund age ,
annual fund returns, the natural logarithm of fund size (TNA), expense ratio, and turnover ratio.
Standard errors are double-clustered by fund-year. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **,
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Flowsi,t
Recession Expansion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
recessiont−1*EU i,t−1 -0.051*** -0.089*** -0.092*** -0.090***
(-3.47) (-5.13) (-5.26) (-4.98)
EU i,t−1 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.046*** -0.094 0.043***
(7.50) (5.00) (4.98) (5.14) (-1.63) (4.75)
ln(fund agei,t−1) -0.022 -0.032** -0.037** -0.032 -0.022
(-1.51) (-2.19) (-2.52) (-0.65) (-1.20)
ln(TNAi,t−1) -0.296*** -0.293*** -0.297*** -1.583*** -0.331***
(-19.07) (-18.64) (-18.59) (-13.20) (-17.60)
flow i,t−1 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.029*** -0.074*** 0.025***
(5.57) (5.54) (5.18) (-4.53) (3.96)
fund return 0.068*** 0.075*** 0.019 -0.038 0.020
(8.81) (9.42) (1.52) (-0.52) (1.57)
turnover i,t−1 -0.004 -0.004 -0.018 -0.001
(-0.57) (-0.66) (-1.11) (-0.13)
expensei,t−1 -0.033 -0.118 -1.880 0.286
(-0.15) (-0.41) (-0.95) (1.01)
alphai,t−1 0.039*** 0.073*** 0.040***
(7.87) (3.14) (7.61)
alpha2i,t−1 -0.001 -0.009 -0.002
(-0.34) (-1.23) (-0.56)
betai,t−1 0.011 0.041** 0.001
(1.29) (2.56) (0.13)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Obs 32794 27464 26863 26572 1882 23809
Adj R2 0.275 0.335 0.340 0.344 0.847 0.371
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the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, the squared of fund performance to account
for the convexity of the flow-performance relationship (Chevalier and Ellison 1997),
and fund risk as measured by the beta coefficient from the CAPM model. Fund
and year fixed effects as well as double-clustered standard errors are included in all
models.
Table 4.7 presents the results. I find that the effect of economic uncertainty is
statistically stronger for mutual funds targeted to retail investors. The effect of
economic uncertainty language is positive and statistically significant at the 1%
significance level for retail investors (column (2) of Table 4.7) and at 5% for insti-
tutional investors targeted funds (column (4) of Table 4.7). The coefficient is larger
for institutional investors potentially because mutual funds targeted to institutions
usually manage large amounts and receive higher flows. These results confirm the
hypothesis that the effect of economic uncertainty language is stronger for investors
with limited attention.
Table 4.7: Document Economic Uncertainty, Clientele, and Fund Flows
This table presents estimates from panel regressions of mutual funds’ % flows on their document’s
uncertainty for retail and institutional investors separately. EU (Economic Uncertainty) is mea-
sured following Baker et al. (2016). We identify retail and institutional investors’ mutual funds
using Morningstar’s classification. All regressions include fund and year fixed effects. I control
for lagged fund-level characteristics, namely alpha and squared alpha based on the Carhart (1997)
four-factor model, beta based on the CAPM, expense ratio, yearly fund flow, the natural logarithm
of fund age , annual fund returns, the natural logarithm of fund size (TNA), expense ratio, and
turnover ratio. Standard errors are double-clustered by fund-year. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Flowsi,t
Retail Institutional
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EU i,t−1 0.012** 0.027*** 0.008 0.050**
(2.10) (2.81) (0.89) (2.14)
Fund Controls No Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Obs 15247 14973 4138 4028
Adj R2 0.132 0.358 0.110 0.329
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4.4.6 Fund Flows, Expenses, and Economic Uncertainty Language
Barber et al. (2005) find that front-end load are more salient for investors when
purchasing funds. Thus, investors are more responsive to higher front-end load
funds by flowing less money to these. If economic uncertainty language serves as a
tool to obfuscate relevant information, then front-end loads should be less salient for
funds with high economic uncertainty language. To test this hypothesis, I investigate
how investors respond to front-end loads for funds with high economic uncertainty.
I define a front-end loads dummy for each fund that charges front-end loads. I define
funds as High EU (economic uncertainty) as funds whose company’s shareholders’
reports are in the top quartile of the document uncertainty distribution for each
year. Low EU are all other funds.
Table 4.8 shows the results. I find that investors are not responsive to front-end
loads when funds have high economic uncertainty language in their shareholders’
reports. For other funds with Low EU, front-end loads remain salient for investors,
which is consistent with Barber et al. (2005). The results confirm the hypothesis that
relevant information is obfuscated when funds communicate more about economic
uncertainty.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, I introduce the study of economic uncertainty in mutual fund com-
munication. Even in the presence of disclosure mandates, information providers
have room for strategic communication. This includes an emphasis on uncertainty
in mutual fund communication which makes a signal about a fund’s products quality
less precise.
When measuring economic uncertainty in mutual fund shareholders’ reports, I find
that uncertainty obfuscates financially relevant information such as upfront costs
and helps mutual funds receive more capital. Poorly performing funds benefit more
from it.
This chapter shows that mutual fund communication matters for understanding
fund flows and investors’ behavior. It is an important topic given the size of the
industry and the previously documented effects of fund flows on asset prices.
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Table 4.8: Document Economic Uncertainty, Expenses, and Fund Flows
This table presents estimates from panel regressions of mutual funds’ % flows on their document’s
uncertainty for funds with and without front-load charges separately. EU (Economic Uncertainty) is
measured following Baker et al. (2016). Front-end loads is a dummy for each fund that charges front-
end loads. High EU represents funds in the top quartile of the document uncertainty distribution
for each year. All regressions include fund and year fixed effects. I control for lagged fund-level
characteristics, namely alpha and squared alpha based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model,
beta based on the CAPM, expense ratio, yearly fund flow, the natural logarithm of fund age , annual
fund returns, the natural logarithm of fund size (TNA), (operating) expense ratio, and turnover
ratio. Standard errors are double-clustered by fund-year. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Flowsi,t
All funds High EU Low EU
(1) (2) (3)
front-end loadsi,t−1 -0.052** -0.029 -0.066***
(-2.57) (-0.56) (-2.76)
Fund Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes
# Obs 26572 5384 20465
Adj R2 0.343 0.403 0.350
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
To conclude, this thesis has investigated the behavior of mutual fund managers in
terms of investment decisions and its effects on fund performance and asset prices,
as well as their behavior when it comes to communicating with their investors.
Regarding the mutual fund performance, the second chapter of this thesis documents
that informational advantage is a potential explanation behind the heterogeneity
of fund performance. The empirical tests in this chapter build on the hypothesis
that fund managers with low holdings similarity with their peers possibly have an
informational advantage about the firms they own. I use network analysis to capture
holdings similarity at the fund level. Using a change in regulation provides a clean
empirical strategy to explore the role of informational advantage in this setting.
Indeed, I show that, following the implementation of this new rule by the regulator
that forced fund managers to reveal their holdings more frequently, mutual fund
managers with low holdings similarity have seen their performance decreased.
To further explore the heterogeneity of mutual fund managers’ investment deci-
sions, Dr. Constantinos Antoniou and I build on the behavioral economics liter-
ature to investigate if personal experience can help explain this heterogeneity. A
growing literature shows that individuals are influenced by their past experiences
when making decisions under risk. We hypothesize that mutual fund managers are
subject to reinforcement learning, that is, they will invest more in companies where
they experienced better returns in the past. We measure experience for each fund
manager as an exponentially weighted moving average of past experienced returns
and find evidence that fund managers are indeed subject to reinforcement learn-
ing. Experiencing good returns affect fund managers’ perception of their skills. As
93
they experience positive outcomes, they become overconfident, attributing these
good outcomes to their ability. Subsequently, they trade more aggressively and earn
lower future returns.
The growth rate of the mutual fund industry has puzzled researchers for many
years, given the mixed evidence of positive returns delivered to investors. In the last
chapter of this thesis, I explore the role of mutual fund communication in explaining
this puzzle. Mutual funds are judged by investors on the basis of their performance.
When a fund performs poorly, it experiences outflows and receives inflows following
positive fund returns. I hypothesize that mutual funds might emphasize on uncertain
economic environment in order to avoid being punished too severely through fund
flows. First, I document that risky and poorly performing funds are more likely to
emphasize on economic uncertainty in their documents, measured by counting the
words related to economic policy uncertainty in their shareholders’ reports. Second,
I find that increasing the number of words related to economic policy uncertainty
has a positive effect on flows, controlling for other fund characteristics such as past
performance and past flows. The effect is stronger for funds with lower performance
and with retail investors. Moreover, financially relevant information, such as front-
end load fees, become less salient when funds communicate more about economic
uncertainty.
This thesis sheds light on a number of topics related to the behavior of mutual fund
managers. It contributes to a large literature on mutual fund performance and its
determinants. It also links the behavioral economics literature on personal experi-
ence effects and the behavior of mutual fund managers which helps explaining the
heterogeneity of their investment decisions. Finally, using mutual fund communi-
cation, which has been little used in the literature, this thesis helps explaining a
long-standing puzzle on the growth of the active mutual fund industry.
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Appendix A
Additional Tables for Chapter 3
Table A.1: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Weight Dollar amount invested in firm j by the manager of fund i at quarter
t obtained from Thomson Reuters, divided by the size of the fund
(total net assets obtained from CRSP) at quarter t:
wi,j,t =
$holdingi,j,t
TNAi,t
.
Weightadj Dollar amount invested in firm j by the manager of fund i at quarter t
divided by the size of the fund (total net assets) at quarter t, adjusted
for the hypothetical weight that this firm would receive if the manager
of fund i was exercising a buy-and-hold strategy using the method in
Kacperczyk et al. (2005):
Weightadji,j,t = wi,j,t − w˜i,j,t−K:t
where
w˜i,j,t−K:t =
wi,j,t−k
∏K
k=0(1 +Rj,t−k)∑
j wi,j,t−k
∏K
k=0(1 +Rj,t−k)
.
(Continued)
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Table A1. Continued: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Experience Exponentially weighted moving average of the returns for firm j ex-
perienced by the manager of fund i. The parameter φ captures the
rate of decay, and reflects the weight on the more recent observa-
tion. We use a functional form that implies a recency effect, i.e., the
weight on the more recent observation is higher. If the manager of
fund i operates with a team, we take a tenure-weighted average of
the experiences for stock j by all managers in fund i, where tenure is
based on the date that each manager first appears in the Morningstar
database:
Experiencei,j,t =
T∑
k=0
(1− φ)kφRj,t−kI[wi,j,t−k>0].
TW-Experience Our alternative experienced returns measure based on Malmendier
and Nagel (2011). According to this measure, managers with shorter
tenure exhibit a stronger recency effect. The tenure of each manager
is based on the date that each manager first appears in the Morn-
ingstar database:
TW − Experiencei,j,t =
tenurei,t−1∑
k=1
ωi,t(k, θ)Rj,t−kI[wi,j,t−k>0]
where
ωi,t(k, θ) =
(tenurei,t − k)θ∑tenurei,t−1
k=1 (tenurei,t − k)θ
.
Experience (style) The experience of the manager of fund i for a specific style. To obtain
the style, we first sort stocks in specific categories (3×3 sort based
on MV and B/M ratio using using NYSE breakpoints. We then use
a 5 × 5 × 5 sort based on MV, B/M ratio using NYSE breakpoints,
and momentum using the prior-year average returns following Daniel
et al. (1997). Finally, we use two industry-based sorts using Fama-
French 12 and 48 industries. We use Compustat SIC codes to assign
firms to industry portfolios. If these are not available, we use CRSP
SIC codes.
(Continued)
96
Table A1. Continued: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
ExperienceDummy Equals to 1 if the manager of fund i is in the top 33%, 25%, or 20%
in the distribution of experienced returns (Experience) for firm j at
a given quarter.
AggExpRetFund A weighted average of Experiencei,j,t at the fund level i in a given
quarter t, where the weights are proportional to the fund’s holdings
in stock j.
AggExpRetFirm A weighted average of Experiencei,j,t at the firm level j in a given
quarter t, where the weights are proportional to the holding by each
fund in firm j.
active share The difference of portfolio holding of firm j by the manager of
fund i at period t relative the benchmark index weight (Cre-
mers and Petajisto 2009) obtained from the authors’ website
(http://www.petajisto.net/data.html).
ASi,t =
1
2
N∑
j=1
|wi,j,t − windex,j,t|.
ChangeShares The percentage change in shares held by the manager of fund i in
stock j from period t− 1 to t adjusted for stock splits.
flow The percentage change between quarter t and quarter t − 1 of total
net assets after taking into account the manager of fund i’s returns
both obtained from CRSP:
flowi,t =
TNAi,t − TNAi,t−1 ∗ (1 +Reti,t)
TNAi,t−1
.
fund return Fund i’s quarterly returns computed from monthly returns reported
by CRSP.
manager tenure The number of months since the manager of fund i first appeared in
the Morningstar database.
(Continued)
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Table A1. Continued: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
performance (fund
alpha)
The difference between the fund’s realized quarterly return in quarter
t and the fund’s expected return at t, as obtained using the Carhart
four-factor model. To obtain factor loadings, we use 24 months re-
turns of past fund return data ending in t-1. Then, using these load-
ings and factor realization at time t, we estimate the fund’s expected
return, which we subtract from the realized return.
%Style The portion of total net assets invested by the manager of fund i in
the style category of firm j (along MV and B/M 3×3 dimensions), as
in Cohen et al. (2008).
style (fund) Fund i style category as reported by Morningstar along the a 3×3
MV and B/M classification.
team A dummy that takes the value 1 if fund i is managed by a team of
managers at time t and 0 otherwise.
TNA The total net assets of fund i in quarter t as reported by CRSP.
tracking error The standard deviation of the difference between the fund’s
return and the fund’s benchmark index return (Cremers
and Petajisto 2009) obtained from the authors’ website
(http://www.petajisto.net/data.html):
TEi,t = σ(|Ri,t −Rindex,t|).
turnover The minimum of aggregated sales or aggregated purchases of securi-
ties obtained from Thomson Reuters divided by the total net assets
of the manager of fund i as reported by CRSP:
turnoveri,t =
min(|salesi,t|, |purchasesi,t|)
TNAi,t
.
(Continued)
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Table A1. Continued: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
MV The total market capitalization of firm j at quarter t as reported by
CRSP (number of shares multiplied by the closing price).
B/M The ratio of the book value of firm j at quarter t to the market
capitalization. We compute the book value from Compustat using
deferred taxes and investment tax credit added to total sharehold-
ers equity and subtract the book value of preferred stock. If the
shareholders’ equity is not available, we use the sum of common and
preferred equity and if these are not available, we use total assets mi-
nus total liabilities as shareholders’ equity. For market capitalization.
we use CRSP outstanding shares multiplied by the closing price and
we adjust for stock splits.
illiq (Amihud) The absolute value of the firm j’s daily stock return over the trading
volume as reported by CRSP averaged over period t:
illiqj,t =
1
T
∑
dt
|rj,dt |
volj,dt
.
own The portion that the manager of fund i owns in firm j with respect to
the firm’s total number of shares outstanding as reported by Thomson
Reuters and CRSP.
ret Quarterly stock returns of firm j computed from monthly returns
reported by CRSP.
SUE The standardized unexpected earnings using the seasonal random
walk model following Livnat and Mendenhall (2006), where SUEj,t =
Earj,t−Earj,t−4
Pj,t
, where Earj,t is earnings per share before extraordi-
nary items for firm j at quarter t, and Pj,t is the stock price for firm
j at the end of quarter t.
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Table A.3: Experienced Returns and Teams
This table presents the results of the effects of managers’ experienced stock returns on investment
decisions for funds of different team size. We rank funds at each quarter into large (top 50%) and
small (bottom 50%) teams after removing all single-managed funds. The dependent variable is the
weight invested by the manager of fund i on stock j at quarter t adjusted for changes due to prices
increase during buy-and-hold periods. The main independent variable is the experience measure,
which is an exponentially weighted moving average of past returns experience by the manager of
fund i on stock j from the time he started investing in it until period t − 1, where the parameter
(rate of decay φ) represents the weight on the most recent return. We estimate φ by selecting the
model that minimizes the regressions’ sum of squared residuals using a tightly spaced grid for φ.
We average experience weighted by the tenure of the team members. Fund controls include the
previous quarter’s natural logarithm of total net assets (TNA) at time, the natural logarithm of
the fund’s age in months, net fund flows, manager tenure (we take an equally-weighted average
for team-managed funds), turnover ratio, and the fund Carhart four-factor alpha. Firm controls
include the natural logarithm of size (market value of equity; MV ), the natural logarithm of book-
to-market (B/M) ratio, and stock return (ret) at t-1, t-2, t-3, and t-4. All specifications include
an unreported intercept. Standard errors are clustered by firm × time (quarter). t-statistics are
reported in parentheses. All continuous independent variables are divided by their sample standard
deviations. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level,
respectively.
Small Large Diff (L-S)
Avg Team Size 2.31 12.29
(1) (2)
Experiencei,j,t−1 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.004***
(10.29) (15.01) (3.82)
Fund Controls YES YES
Firm Controls YES YES
Fixed Effects Style x Time Style x Time
Parameter 0.22 0.29
# Obs. 1,824,507 1,784,755
Adj R2 0.275 0.219
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Table A.4: Style-Level Experience and Tenure
This table presents the results of the effect of experienced returns on investment decisions at the
style level, following the procedures explained in the note to Table 2. The dependent variable is
Weightadji,j,t, averaged equally for specific styles for fund i and quarter t. The key independent
variable is TW-Experience, value-weighted averaged at the style level. TW-Experience is our al-
ternative measure for experienced returns, following Malmendier and Nagel (2011), which allows
managers with shorter tenures to exhibit a stronger recency effect (TW-Experience). We consider
four different style categorizations: a split of all stocks according to MV and B/M (3×3 sorts)
(column (1)), a categorization based on Daniel et al. (1997), where stocks are sorted in 5 × 5 × 5
portfolios based on MV, B/M and return momentum (column (2)), and industry categorizations
using 12 or 48 industries, using Fama/French definitions (columns (3)-(4)). All specifications in-
clude a style × time fixed effect, a fund fixed effect and an unreported intercept. For definitions
of the variables, see Table A1 in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the style × time
level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. All continuous independent variables are divided by
their sample standard deviations. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% confidence level respectively.
Morningstar DGTW F-F 12 Industries F-F 48 Industries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TW-Experiencei,s,t−1 0.067*** 0.059*** 0.066*** 0.074***
(16.04) (65.81) (35.12) (62.05)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Fixed Effects Style x Time Style x Time Industry x Time Industry x Time
Fixed Effects Fund Fund Fund Fund
Parameter 4 4 3.9 3.7
#Obs 255,468 2,180,365 659,179 1,452,521
Adj R2 0.489 0.461 0.467 0.449
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Appendix B
Additional Tables for Chapter 4
Example of N-CSR content:
US equity markets rose overall during the period, benefiting from mostly upbeat economic
data and better US corporate earnings. Markets were also supported in 2017 by the prospect
for reforms in the European Union with Emmanuel Macrons election as Frances president,
the Federal Reserve’s indication of gradual rate hikes and the passage of the US tax reform
bill. However, concerns about political uncertainties in the US, tensions between the US and
North Korea, and the progress of the US tax reform bill curbed market sentiment at times.
After reaching new all-time highs in January 2018, US stocks declined in February amid
concerns that strong economic growth and rising inflation would lead the Federal Reserve to
increase its target rate faster than expected. In March, markets were pressured further by
a broad sell-off in information technology stocks due to a potential for tighter regulation in
the sector arising from concerns about consumer data privacy. The Trump administrations
protectionist policies and escalating trade tensions between the US and China also dampened
investor sentiment.
Franklin Templeton Fund, 2018 Annual Shareholders’ Report
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Table B.1: Document Economic Uncertainty, Morningstar Ratings, and Fund Flows
This table presents estimates from panel regressions of mutual funds’ % flows on their document’s
uncertainty. EU (Economic Uncertainty) is measured following Baker et al. (2016). All regressions
include fund and year fixed effects. I control for lagged fund-level characteristics, namely Morn-
ingstar ratings, alpha and squared alpha based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, beta based
on the CAPM, expense ratio, yearly fund flow, the natural logarithm of fund age , annual fund
returns, the natural logarithm of fund size (TNA), expense ratio, and turnover ratio. Standard
errors are double-clustered by fund-year. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Flowsi,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EU i,t−1 0.017 0.028* 0.028* 0.030**
(1.08) (1.92) (1.96) (2.07)
rating i,t−1 0.045*** 0.105*** 0.107*** 0.111***
(5.51) (11.37) (11.42) (11.65)
ln(fund agei,t−1) 0.002 0.004 0.007
(0.09) (0.14) (0.27)
ln(TNAi,t−1) -0.393*** -0.395*** -0.402***
(-14.89) (-14.79) (-14.86)
flow i,t−1 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.025***
(2.74) (2.61) (2.69)
fund returni,t−1 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.035*
(6.33) (6.25) (1.82)
turnover i,t−1 0.005 0.001
(0.51) (0.11)
expensei,t−1 0.012 0.004
(0.38) (0.14)
alphai,t−1 0.036***
(5.19)
alpha2i,t−1 -0.003
(-0.58)
betai,t−1 0.047***
(5.02)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Obs 9577 9577 9522 9424
Adj R2 0.288 0.362 0.363 0.366
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Table B.2: Relative Document Economic Uncertainty and Fund Flows
This table presents estimates from panel regressions of mutual funds’ % flows on their relative
document’s uncertainty. Relative EU (Relative Economic Uncertainty) is measured following Baker
et al. (2016) and adjusted by the average document uncertainty within each fund style category
as defined by Morningstar style categories. All regressions include fund and year fixed effects. I
control for lagged fund-level characteristics, namely alpha and squared alpha based on the Carhart
(1997) four-factor model, beta based on the CAPM, expense ratio, yearly fund flow, the natural
logarithm of fund age , annual fund returns, the natural logarithm of fund size (TNA), expense ratio,
and turnover ratio. Standard errors are double-clustered by fund-year. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Flowsi,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relative EU i,t−1 0.024*** 0.019** 0.020** 0.021**
(3.51) (2.13) (2.23) (2.33)
ln(fund agei,t−1) -0.028* -0.026 -0.033*
(-1.68) (-1.52) (-1.93)
ln(TNAi,t−1) -0.298*** -0.301*** -0.306***
(-18.35) (-18.02) (-18.17)
flow i,t−1 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.041***
(6.88) (6.88) (6.52)
fund returni,t−1 0.139*** 0.142*** 0.033*
(10.13) (10.30) (1.82)
turnover i,t−1 -0.007 -0.007
(-1.14) (-1.17)
expensei,t−1 -0.014 -0.023
(-0.64) (-1.02)
alphai,t−1 0.073***
(9.97)
alpha2i,t−1 -0.008*
(-1.70)
betai,t−1 0.004
(0.49)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Style-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Obs 22573 19208 19072 18907
Adj R2 0.283 0.354 0.355 0.362
105
Bibliography
Vikas Agarwal, Kevin A Mullally, Yuehua Tang, and Baozhong Yang. Mandatory
portfolio disclosure, stock liquidity, and mutual fund performance. Journal of
Finance, 70(6):2733–2776, 2015.
Kenneth R Ahern. Network centrality and the cross section of stock returns. 2013.
Working paper, University of Southern California.
Ferhat Akbas, Will J Armstrong, Sorin Sorescu, and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam.
Smart money, dumb money, and capital market anomalies. Journal of Financial
Economics, 118(2):355–382, 2015.
Klakow Akepanidtaworn, Rick Di Mascio, Alex Imas, and Lawrence Schmidt. Sell-
ing fast and buying slow: Heuristics and trading performance of institutional
investors, 2018. Working paper, University of Chicago.
Yakov Amihud. Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series effects.
Journal of financial markets, 5(1):31–56, 2002.
Yakov Amihud and Ruslan Goyenko. Mutual fund’s r2 as predictor of performance.
Review of Financial Studies, 26(3):667–694, 2013.
Miguel Anton and Christopher Polk. Connected stocks. Journal of Finance, 69(3):
1099–1127, 2014.
Alan D Baddeley and Graham Hitch. The recency effect: Implicit learning with
explicit retrieval? Memory & Cognition, 21(2):146–155, 1993.
John Jianqiu Bai, Linlin Ma, Kevin A Mullally, and David H Solomon. What
a difference a (birth) month makes: The relative age effect and fund manager
performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 132(1):200–221, 2019.
Scott R Baker, Nicholas Bloom, and Steven J Davis. Measuring economic policy
uncertainty. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131(4):1593–1636, 2016.
106
Rolf W Banz. The relationship between return and market value of common stocks.
Journal of Financial Economics, 9(1):3–18, 1981.
Brad Barber, Reuven Lehavy, Maureen McNichols, and Brett Trueman. Can in-
vestors profit from the prophets? security analyst recommendations and stock
returns. Journal of Finance, 56(2):531–563, 2001.
Brad M Barber and Terrance Odean. Trading is hazardous to your wealth: The
common stock investment performance of individual investors. Journal of Finance,
55(2):773–806, 2000.
Brad M Barber, Terrance Odean, and Lu Zheng. Out of sight, out of mind: The
effects of expenses on mutual fund flows. Journal of Business, 78(6):2095–2120,
2005.
Nicholas Barberis and Andrei Shleifer. Style investing. Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics, 68(2):161–199, 2003.
Greg Barron and Ido Erev. Small feedback-based decisions and their limited corre-
spondence to description-based decisions. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making,
16(3):215–233, 2003.
So¨hnke M Bartram, John M Griffin, Tae-Hoon Lim, and David T Ng. How important
are foreign ownership linkages for international stock returns? Review of Financial
Studies, 28(11):3036–3072, 2015.
Suleyman Basak and Anna Pavlova. Asset prices and institutional investors. Amer-
ican Economic Review, 103(5):1728–58, 2013.
Itzhak Ben-David, Jiacui Li, Andrea Rossi, and Yang Song. What do mutual fund
investors really care about? 2018. Working paper, Ohio State University.
Jonathan B Berk and Richard C Green. Mutual fund flows and performance in
rational markets. Journal of Political Economy, 112(6):1269–1295, 2004.
Gennaro Bernile, Vineet Bhagwat, Ambrus Kecskes, and Phuong-Anh Nguyen. Are
the risk attitudes of professional investors affected by personal catastrophic expe-
riences?, 2017. Working paper, University of Miami.
Marianne Bertrand, Dean Karlan, Sendhil Mullainathan, Eldar Shafir, and Jonathan
Zinman. What’s advertising content worth? evidence from a consumer credit
marketing field experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(1):263–306,
2010.
107
John Beshears, James J Choi, David Laibson, and Brigitte C Madrian. How does
simplified disclosure affect individuals’ mutual fund choices? 2009. National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Phillip Bonacich. Power and centrality: A family of measures. American Journal
of Sociology, pages 1170–1182, 1987.
Markus Brunnermeier and Stefan Nagel. Hedge funds and the technology bubble.
Journal of Finance, 59(5):2013–2040, 2004.
Andrea M Buffa, Dimitri Vayanos, and Paul Woolley. Asset management contracts
and equilibrium prices. 2014. Working paper, London School of Economics.
Colin Camerer and Teck Hua Ho. Experience-weighted attraction learning in normal
form games. Econometrica, 67(4):827–874, 1999.
Mark M Carhart. On persistence in mutual fund performance. Journal of Finance,
52(1):57–82, 1997.
Claire Ce´le´rier and Boris Valle´e. Catering to investors through security design:
Headline rate and complexity. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132(3):1469–1508,
2017.
Cristina Cella, Andrew Ellul, and Mariassunta Giannetti. Investors’ horizons and
the amplification of market shocks. Review of Financial Studies, 26(7):1607–1648,
2013.
Joseph Chen, Harrison Hong, Ming Huang, and Jeffrey D Kubik. Does fund size
erode mutual fund performance? the role of liquidity and organization. American
Economic Review, 94(5):1276–1302, 2004.
Sergey Chernenko and Adi Sunderam. Do fire sales create externalities? 2017.
Working paper, Harvard Business School.
Sergey Chernenko, Samuel G Hanson, and Adi Sunderam. Who neglects risk? in-
vestor experience and the credit boom. Journal of Financial Economics, 122(2):
248–269, 2016.
Judith Chevalier and Glenn Ellison. Risk taking by mutual funds as a response to
incentives. Journal of Political Economy, 105(6):1167–1200, 1997.
Judith Chevalier and Glenn Ellison. Career concerns of mutual fund managers.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(2):389–432, 1999.
108
Gjergji Cici, Monika Gehde-Trapp, Marc-Andre´ Go¨ricke, and Alexander Kempf.
The investment value of fund managers experience outside the financial sector.
Review of Financial Studies, 31(10):3821–3853, 2018.
Stephen Coate. Political competition with campaign contributions and informative
advertising. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2(5):772–804, 2004.
Lauren Cohen, Andrea Frazzini, and Christopher Malloy. The small world of invest-
ing: Board connections and mutual fund returns. Journal of Political Economy,
116(5):951–979, 2008.
Randolph B Cohen, Joshua D Coval, and L’ubosˇ Pa´stor. Judging fund managers
by the company they keep. Journal of Finance, 60(3):1057–1096, 2005.
Michael J Cooper, Huseyin Gulen, and Michael J Schill. Asset growth and the
cross-section of stock returns. Journal of Finance, 63(4):1609–1651, 2008.
Joshua Coval and Erik Stafford. Asset fire sales (and purchases) in equity markets.
Journal of Financial Economics, 86(2):479–512, 2007.
Joshua D Coval and Tobias J Moskowitz. Home bias at home: Local equity prefer-
ence in domestic portfolios. Journal of Finance, 54(6):2045–2073, 1999.
Vincent P Crawford and Joel Sobel. Strategic information transmission. Economet-
rica, pages 1431–1451, 1982.
KJ Martijn Cremers and Antti Petajisto. How active is your fund manager? a new
measure that predicts performance. Review of Financial Studies, 22(9):3329–3365,
2009.
Domenico Cuoco and Ron Kaniel. Equilibrium prices in the presence of delegated
portfolio management. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(2):264–296, 2011.
Zhi Da, Xing Huang, and Lawrence J Jin. Extrapolative beliefs in the cross-section:
What can we learn from the crowds?, 2018. Working paper, University of Notre
Dame.
Kent Daniel, Mark Grinblatt, Sheridan Titman, and Russ Wermers. Measuring mu-
tual fund performance with characteristic-based benchmarks. Journal of Finance,
52(3):1035–1058, 1997.
Werner FM De Bondt and Richard Thaler. Does the stock market overreact? Jour-
nal of finance, 40(3):793–805, 1985.
109
Stefano DellaVigna and Ethan Kaplan. The fox news effect: Media bias and voting.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(3):1187–1234, 2007.
Hitesh Doshi, Redouane Elkamhi, and Mikhail Simutin. Managerial activeness and
mutual fund performance. Review of Asset Pricing Studies, 5(2):156–184, 2015.
Edwin J Elton, Martin J Gruber, and Christopher R Blake. A first look at the
accuracy of the crsp mutual fund database and a comparison of the crsp and
morningstar mutual fund databases. Journal of Finance, 56(6):2415–2430, 2001.
Joseph E Engelberg and Christopher A Parsons. The causal impact of media in
financial markets. Journal of Finance, 66(1):67–97, 2011.
Ido Erev and Alvin E Roth. Predicting how people play games: Reinforcement
learning in experimental games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria. American
Economic Review, pages 848–881, 1998.
Eric G Falkenstein. Preferences for stock characteristics as revealed by mutual fund
portfolio holdings. Journal of Finance, 51(1):111–135, 1996.
Eugene F Fama and Kenneth R French. Common risk factors in the returns on
stocks and bonds. Journal of Financial Economics, 33(1):3–56, 1993.
Eugene F Fama and Kenneth R French. Multifactor explanations of asset pricing
anomalies. Journal of Finance, 51(1):55–84, 1996.
Eugene F Fama and Kenneth R French. Industry costs of equity. Journal of Finan-
cial Economics, 43(2):153–193, 1997.
Eugene F Fama and Kenneth R French. Luck versus skill in the cross-section of
mutual fund returns. Journal of Finance, 65(5):1915–1947, 2010.
Eugene F Fama and Kenneth R French. A five-factor asset pricing model. Journal
of Financial Economics, 116(1):1–22, 2015.
Francesco Franzoni and Martin C Schmalz. Fund flows and market states. Review
of Financial Studies, 30(8):2621–2673, 2017.
Andrea Frazzini and Owen A Lamont. Dumb money: Mutual fund flows and the
cross-section of stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 88(2):299–322,
2008.
Nicolae B Garleanu and Lasse H Pedersen. Efficiently inefficient markets for assets
and asset management. Journal of Finance, 2017. forthcoming.
110
Matthew Gentzkow, Bryan T Kelly, and Matt Taddy. Text as data. Technical
report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017.
Nataliya Gerasimova. House of funds, 2016. Working paper, NHH Norwegian School
of Economics.
Simon Gervais and Terrance Odean. Learning to be overconfident. Review of Fi-
nancial Studies, 14(1):1–27, 2001.
Robin Greenwood and Stefan Nagel. Inexperienced investors and bubbles. Journal
of Financial Economics, 93(2):239–258, 2009.
Robin Greenwood and Andrei Shleifer. Expectations of returns and expected re-
turns. Review of Financial Studies, 27(3):714–746, 2014.
Robin Greenwood and David Thesmar. Stock price fragility. Journal of Financial
Economics, 102(3):471–490, 2011.
Mark Grinblatt and Sheridan Titman. Mutual fund performance: An analysis of
quarterly portfolio holdings. Journal of Business, pages 393–416, 1989.
Mark Grinblatt and Sheridan Titman. Performance measurement without bench-
marks: An examination of mutual fund returns. Journal of business, pages 47–68,
1993.
Mark Grinblatt, Sheridan Titman, and Russ Wermers. Momentum investment
strategies, portfolio performance, and herding: A study of mutual fund behavior.
American Economic Review, pages 1088–1105, 1995.
Sanford J Grossman. The informational role of warranties and private disclosure
about product quality. The Journal of Law and Economics, 24(3):461–483, 1981.
Sanford J Grossman and Joseph E Stiglitz. On the impossibility of informationally
efficient markets. American Economic Review, 70(3):393–408, 1980.
Martin J Gruber. Another puzzle: The growth in actively managed mutual funds.
Journal of Finance, 51(3):783–810, 1996.
Stanislao Gualdi, Giulio Cimini, Kevin Primicerio, Riccardo Di Clemente, and
Damien Challet. Statistically validated network of portfolio overlaps and sys-
temic risk. Scientific Reports, 6:39467, 2016.
Robert A Haugen and Nardin L Baker. Commonality in the determinants of ex-
pected stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 41(3):401–439, 1996.
111
Martin F Hellwig. On the aggregation of information in competitive markets. Jour-
nal of Economic Theory, 22(3):477–498, 1980.
Alexander Hillert, Alexandra Niessen-Ruenzi, and Stefan Ruenzi. Mutual fund
shareholder letter tone-do investors listen? 2014. Working paper, University
of Mannheim.
Gerard Hoberg, Nitin Kumar, and Nagpurnanand Prabhala. Mutual fund compe-
tition, managerial skill, and alpha persistence. The Review of Financial Studies,
31(5):1896–1929, 2017.
Yael V Hochberg, Alexander Ljungqvist, and Yang Lu. Whom you know matters:
Venture capital networks and investment performance. Journal of Finance, 62(1):
251–301, 2007.
Yael V Hochberg, Alexander Ljungqvist, and Yang Lu. Networking as a barrier to
entry and the competitive supply of venture capital. Journal of Finance, 65(3):
829–859, 2010.
Shiyang Huang, Dong Lou, and Christopher Polk. The booms and busts of beta
arbitrage, 2016. Working paper, London School of Economics.
Markus Ibert, Ron Kaniel, Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, and Roine Vestman. Are mutual
fund managers paid for investment skill? Review of Financial Studies, 31(2):715–
772, 2017.
Narasimhan Jegadeesh and Sheridan Titman. Returns to buying winners and selling
losers: Implications for stock market efficiency. Journal of Finance, 48(1):65–91,
1993.
Narasimhan Jegadeesh and Sheridan Titman. Profitability of momentum strategies:
An evaluation of alternative explanations. Journal of Finance, 56(2):699–720,
2001.
Narasimhan Jegadeesh and Di Wu. Word power: A new approach for content
analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 110(3):712–729, 2013.
Michael C Jensen. The performance of mutual funds in the period 1945–1964.
Journal of Finance, 23(2):389–416, 1968.
Hao Jiang and Michela Verardo. Does herding behavior reveal skill? an analysis of
mutual fund performance. Journal of Finance, 73(5):2229–2269, 2018.
112
Hao Jiang, Marno Verbeek, and Yu Wang. Information content when mutual funds
deviate from benchmarks. Management Science, 60(8):2038–2053, 2014.
Peiran Jiao. Payoff-based belief distortion, 2017. Working paper, Maastricht Uni-
versity.
Justin P Johnson and David P Myatt. On the simple economics of advertising,
marketing, and product design. American Economic Review, 96(3):756–784, 2006.
Marcin Kacperczyk, Clemens Sialm, and Lu Zheng. On the industry concentration
of actively managed equity mutual funds. Journal of Finance, 60(4):1983–2011,
2005.
Marcin Kacperczyk, Clemens Sialm, and Lu Zheng. Unobserved actions of mutual
funds. Review of Financial Studies, 21(6):2379–2416, 2006.
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. On the psychology of prediction. Psycholog-
ical Review, 80(4):237, 1973.
Markku Kaustia and Samuli Knu¨pfer. Do investors overweight personal experience?
evidence from ipo subscriptions. Journal of Finance, 63(6):2679–2702, 2008.
Elisabeth Kempf, Alberto Manconi, and Oliver G Spalt. Learning by doing: The
value of experience and the origins of skill for mutual fund managers, 2016. Work-
ing paper, University of Chicago.
Alok Kumar. Dynamic style preferences of individual investors and stock returns.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 44(3):607–640, 2009.
Albert S Kyle. Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica, pages 1315–
1335, 1985.
Josef Lakonishok, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W Vishny. Contrarian investment,
extrapolation, and risk. Journal of Finance, 49(5):1541–1578, 1994.
Anton Lines. Do institutional incentives distort asset prices? 2016. Working paper,
Columbia University.
Walter Lippmann. Public opinion. New York, 1922.
Joshua Livnat and Richard R Mendenhall. Comparing the post–earnings announce-
ment drift for surprises calculated from analyst and time series forecasts. Journal
of accounting research, 44(1):177–205, 2006.
113
Dong Lou. A flow-based explanation for return predictability. Review of Financial
Studies, 25(12):3457–3489, 2012.
Dong Lou and Christopher Polk. Comomentum: Inferring arbitrage activity from
return correlations, 2012. Working paper, London School of Economics.
Tim Loughran and Bill McDonald. When is a liability not a liability? textual
analysis, dictionaries, and 10-ks. Journal of Finance, 66(1):35–65, 2011.
Tim Loughran and Bill McDonald. Measuring readability in financial disclosures.
Journal of Finance, 69(4):1643–1671, 2014.
Elliot A Ludvig, Christopher R Madan, and Marcia L Spetch. Priming memories
of past wins induces risk seeking. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General,
144(1):24, 2015.
Linlin Ma, Yuehua Tang, and Juan-pedro Go´mez. Portfolio manager compensation
in the us mutual fund industry. The Journal of Finance, 74(2):587–638, 2019.
Burton G Malkiel. Returns from investing in equity mutual funds 1971 to 1991.
Journal of Finance, 50(2):549–572, 1995.
Ulrike Malmendier and Stefan Nagel. Depression babies: do macroeconomic ex-
periences affect risk taking? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(1):373–416,
2011.
Ulrike Malmendier, Stefan Nagel, and Zhen Yan. The making of hawks and doves:
Inflation experiences on the fomc, 2017. Working paper, University of California,
Berkeley.
Massimo Massa and Zahid Rehman. Information flows within financial conglom-
erates: Evidence from the banks–mutual funds relation. Journal of Financial
Economics, 89(2):288–306, 2008.
Paul R Milgrom. Good news and bad news: Representation theorems and applica-
tions. Bell Journal of Economics, pages 380–391, 1981.
Sendhil Mullainathan, Joshua Schwartzstein, and Andrei Shleifer. Coarse thinking
and persuasion. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(2):577–619, 2008.
Terrance Odean. Do investors trade too much? American Economic Review, 89(5):
1279–1298, 1999.
114
Han N Ozsoylev, Johan Walden, M Deniz Yavuz, and Recep Bildik. Investor net-
works in the stock market. Review of Financial Studies, 27(5):1323–1366, 2014.
L’ubosˇ Pa´stor, Robert F Stambaugh, and Lucian A Taylor. Scale and skill in active
management. Journal of Financial Economics, 116(1):23–45, 2015.
Petra Persson. Attention manipulation and information overload. Behavioural Pub-
lic Policy, 2(1):78–106, 2018.
Antti Petajisto. Active share and mutual fund performance. Financial Analysts
Journal, 69(4):73–93, 2013.
Martin F Porter. An algorithm for suffix stripping. Program, 14(3):130–137, 1980.
Andrea Prat. Rational voters and political advertising. The Oxford Handbook of
Political Economy, pages 50–63, 2006.
Jay R Ritter and Donghang Zhang. Affiliated mutual funds and the allocation of
initial public offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 86(2):337–368, 2007.
Barr Rosenberg, Kenneth Reid, and Ronald Lanstein. Persuasive evidence of market
inefficiency. Journal of Portfolio Management, 11(3):9–16, 1985.
Alberto G Rossi, David Blake, Allan Timmermann, Ian Tonks, and Russ Wermers.
Network centrality and delegated investment performance. Journal of Financial
Economics, 128(1):183–206, 2018.
Tao Shu, Johan Sulaeman, and P Eric Yeung. Cost of bereavement: How does
parental loss affect mutual fund managers?, 2017. Working paper, University of
Georgia.
Christopher A Sims. Implications of rational inattention. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 50(3):665–690, 2003.
Erik R Sirri and Peter Tufano. Costly search and mutual fund flows. Journal of
Finance, 53(5):1589–1622, 1998.
Jeremy C Stein. Presidential address: Sophisticated investors and market efficiency.
Journal of Finance, 64(4):1517–1548, 2009.
George J Stigler. The economics of information. Journal of Political Economy, 69
(3):213–225, 1961.
115
George J Stigler. The theory of price. fourth edition, Macmillan Company.; New
York, 1987.
Zheng Sun, Ashley Wang, and Lu Zheng. The road less traveled: Strategy distinc-
tiveness and hedge fund performance. Review of Financial Studies, 25(1):96–143,
2012.
Melvyn Teo and Sung-Jun Woo. Style effects in the cross-section of stock returns.
Journal of Financial Economics, 74(2):367–398, 2004.
Paul C Tetlock. Giving content to investor sentiment: The role of media in the
stock market. Journal of Finance, 62(3):1139–1168, 2007.
Sheridan Titman and Cristian Tiu. Do the best hedge funds hedge? Review of
Financial Studies, 24(1):123–168, 2011.
Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh and Laura Veldkamp. Information immobility and the home
bias puzzle. Journal of Finance, 64(3):1187–1215, 2009.
Laura L Veldkamp. Media frenzies in markets for financial information. American
Economic Review, 96(3):577–601, 2006.
Sunil Wahal and Albert Yan Wang. Competition among mutual funds. Journal of
Financial Economics, 99(1):40–59, 2011.
Russ Wermers. Mutual fund performance: An empirical decomposition into stock-
picking talent, style, transactions costs, and expenses. Journal of Finance, 55(4):
1655–1703, 2000.
X Frank Zhang. Information uncertainty and stock returns. Journal of Finance, 61
(1):105–137, 2006.
116
